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Jul 27

Bench-NPIN: Benchmarking Non-prehensile Interactive Navigation

Mobile robots are increasingly deployed in unstructured environments where obstacles and objects are movable. Navigation in such environments is known as interactive navigation, where task completion requires not only avoiding obstacles but also strategic interactions with movable objects. Non-prehensile interactive navigation focuses on non-grasping interaction strategies, such as pushing, rather than relying on prehensile manipulation. Despite a growing body of research in this field, most solutions are evaluated using case-specific setups, limiting reproducibility and cross-comparison. In this paper, we present Bench-NPIN, the first comprehensive benchmark for non-prehensile interactive navigation. Bench-NPIN includes multiple components: 1) a comprehensive range of simulated environments for non-prehensile interactive navigation tasks, including navigating a maze with movable obstacles, autonomous ship navigation in icy waters, box delivery, and area clearing, each with varying levels of complexity; 2) a set of evaluation metrics that capture unique aspects of interactive navigation, such as efficiency, interaction effort, and partial task completion; and 3) demonstrations using Bench-NPIN to evaluate example implementations of established baselines across environments. Bench-NPIN is an open-source Python library with a modular design. The code, documentation, and trained models can be found at https://github.com/IvanIZ/BenchNPIN.

  • 5 authors
·
May 17, 2025

AdInject: Real-World Black-Box Attacks on Web Agents via Advertising Delivery

Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Web Agents represent a significant step towards automating complex tasks by simulating human-like interaction with websites. However, their deployment in uncontrolled web environments introduces significant security vulnerabilities. Existing research on adversarial environmental injection attacks often relies on unrealistic assumptions, such as direct HTML manipulation, knowledge of user intent, or access to agent model parameters, limiting their practical applicability. In this paper, we propose AdInject, a novel and real-world black-box attack method that leverages the internet advertising delivery to inject malicious content into the Web Agent's environment. AdInject operates under a significantly more realistic threat model than prior work, assuming a black-box agent, static malicious content constraints, and no specific knowledge of user intent. AdInject includes strategies for designing malicious ad content aimed at misleading agents into clicking, and a VLM-based ad content optimization technique that infers potential user intents from the target website's context and integrates these intents into the ad content to make it appear more relevant or critical to the agent's task, thus enhancing attack effectiveness. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of AdInject, attack success rates exceeding 60% in most scenarios and approaching 100% in certain cases. This strongly demonstrates that prevalent advertising delivery constitutes a potent and real-world vector for environment injection attacks against Web Agents. This work highlights a critical vulnerability in Web Agent security arising from real-world environment manipulation channels, underscoring the urgent need for developing robust defense mechanisms against such threats. Our code is available at https://github.com/NicerWang/AdInject.

  • 8 authors
·
May 27, 2025 2

When Claws Remember but Do Not Tell: Stealthy Memory Injection in Persistent Personal Agents

Persistent personal agents combine long-term memory with access to users' external environments, enabling personalized foreground assistance and proactive background execution. This integration also creates a new path to compromise: untrusted external content can be silently written into persistent memory and later reused as trusted state. We study this threat as stealth memory injection, in which a remote black-box adversary delivers a single email payload that must induce the agent to write poisoned memory, stay hidden in the agent's response to the user, and affect future behavior. We introduce WhisperBench, a 108-case benchmark spanning five risk categories and both fact and preference poisoning. Built on a real IMAP/SMTP workflow and an authentic email agent skill, it enables full-cycle evaluation of stealth memory injection attacks. To enable this black-box attack under single-email delivery and without runtime feedback, we propose MemGhost, a one-shot payload generation framework. MemGhost uses an environment proxy to emulate persistent-agent execution and an objective proxy to convert memory adoption and conversational stealth into dense rubric-based rewards, then trains the attacker policy with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. Across 56 held-out test cases, MemGhost achieves 87.5% end-to-end success on OpenClaw with GPT-5.4 and 71.4% on Claude Code SDK with Sonnet 4.6. It also transfers across personal-agent architectures (NanoClaw and Hermes Agent) and memory backends (filesystem and vector-based Mem0), and remains effective against input-level, model-level, and system-level defenses. These results suggest that persistent memory can turn ordinary external processing into a practical pathway for long-term agent compromise.

  • 8 authors
·
Jul 5