Daily Papers

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, introduces critical risks to safety, security, and privacy. These agents may deviate from user objectives, violate data handling policies, or be compromised by adversarial attacks. Mitigating these dangers necessitates a mechanism to formally guarantee that an agent's actions adhere to predefined safety constraints, a challenge that existing systems do not fully address. We introduce VeriGuard, a novel framework that provides formal safety guarantees for LLM-based agents through a dual-stage architecture designed for robust and verifiable correctness. The initial offline stage involves a comprehensive validation process. It begins by clarifying user intent to establish precise safety specifications. VeriGuard then synthesizes a behavioral policy and subjects it to both testing and formal verification to prove its compliance with these specifications. This iterative process refines the policy until it is deemed correct. Subsequently, the second stage provides online action monitoring, where VeriGuard operates as a runtime monitor to validate each proposed agent action against the pre-verified policy before execution. This separation of the exhaustive offline validation from the lightweight online monitoring allows formal guarantees to be practically applied, providing a robust safeguard that substantially improves the trustworthiness of LLM agents.

As AI agents move from chat interfaces to systems that read private data, call tools, and execute multi-step workflows, guardrails become a last line of defense against concrete deployment harms. In these settings, guardrail failures are no longer merely answer-quality errors: they can leak secrets, authorize unsafe actions, or block legitimate work. The hardest failures are often contextual: whether an action is acceptable depends on local privacy norms, organizational policies, and user expectations that resist pre-deployment specification. This creates a practical gap: guardrails must adapt to their own operating environments, yet deployment feedback is typically limited to sparse, noisy user-reported failures, and repeated fine-tuning is often impractical. To address this gap, we propose LiSA (Lifelong Safety Adaptation), a conservative policy induction framework that improves a fixed base guardrail through structured memory. LiSA converts occasional failures into reusable policy abstractions so that sparse reports can generalize beyond individual cases, adds conflict-aware local rules to prevent overgeneralization in mixed-label contexts, and applies evidence-aware confidence gating via a posterior lower bound, so that memory reuse scales with accumulated evidence rather than empirical accuracy alone. Across PrivacyLens+, ConFaide+, and AgentHarm, LiSA consistently outperforms strong memory-based baselines under sparse feedback, remains robust under noisy user feedback even at 20% label-flip rates, and pushes the latency--performance frontier beyond backbone model scaling. Ultimately, LiSA offers a practical path to secure AI agents against the unpredictable long tail of real-world edge risks.

Recent advancements in language models (LMs) have notably enhanced their ability to reason with tabular data, primarily through program-aided mechanisms that manipulate and analyze tables. However, these methods often require the entire table as input, leading to scalability challenges due to the positional bias or context length constraints. In response to these challenges, we introduce TableRAG, a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) framework specifically designed for LM-based table understanding. TableRAG leverages query expansion combined with schema and cell retrieval to pinpoint crucial information before providing it to the LMs. This enables more efficient data encoding and precise retrieval, significantly reducing prompt lengths and mitigating information loss. We have developed two new million-token benchmarks from the Arcade and BIRD-SQL datasets to thoroughly evaluate TableRAG's effectiveness at scale. Our results demonstrate that TableRAG's retrieval design achieves the highest retrieval quality, leading to the new state-of-the-art performance on large-scale table understanding.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in assisting cybersecurity tasks, yet existing approaches struggle with automatic vulnerability discovery and exploitation due to limited interaction, weak execution grounding, and a lack of experience reuse. We propose Co-RedTeam, a security-aware multi-agent framework designed to mirror real-world red-teaming workflows by integrating security-domain knowledge, code-aware analysis, execution-grounded iterative reasoning, and long-term memory. Co-RedTeam decomposes vulnerability analysis into coordinated discovery and exploitation stages, enabling agents to plan, execute, validate, and refine actions based on real execution feedback while learning from prior trajectories. Extensive evaluations on challenging security benchmarks demonstrate that Co-RedTeam consistently outperforms strong baselines across diverse backbone models, achieving over 60% success rate in vulnerability exploitation and over 10% absolute improvement in vulnerability detection. Ablation and iteration studies further confirm the critical role of execution feedback, structured interaction, and memory for building robust and generalizable cybersecurity agents.

Deep research agents, powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), are rapidly advancing; yet, their performance often plateaus when generating complex, long-form research reports using generic test-time scaling algorithms. Drawing inspiration from the iterative nature of human research, which involves cycles of searching, reasoning, and revision, we propose the Test-Time Diffusion Deep Researcher (TTD-DR). This novel framework conceptualizes research report generation as a diffusion process. TTD-DR initiates this process with a preliminary draft, an updatable skeleton that serves as an evolving foundation to guide the research direction. The draft is then iteratively refined through a "denoising" process, which is dynamically informed by a retrieval mechanism that incorporates external information at each step. The core process is further enhanced by a self-evolutionary algorithm applied to each component of the agentic workflow, ensuring the generation of high-quality context for the diffusion process. This draft-centric design makes the report writing process more timely and coherent while reducing information loss during the iterative search process. We demonstrate that our TTD-DR achieves state-of-the-art results on a wide array of benchmarks that require intensive search and multi-hop reasoning, significantly outperforming existing deep research agents.

Table-based reasoning with large language models (LLMs) is a promising direction to tackle many table understanding tasks, such as table-based question answering and fact verification. Compared with generic reasoning, table-based reasoning requires the extraction of underlying semantics from both free-form questions and semi-structured tabular data. Chain-of-Thought and its similar approaches incorporate the reasoning chain in the form of textual context, but it is still an open question how to effectively leverage tabular data in the reasoning chain. We propose the Chain-of-Table framework, where tabular data is explicitly used in the reasoning chain as a proxy for intermediate thoughts. Specifically, we guide LLMs using in-context learning to iteratively generate operations and update the table to represent a tabular reasoning chain. LLMs can therefore dynamically plan the next operation based on the results of the previous ones. This continuous evolution of the table forms a chain, showing the reasoning process for a given tabular problem. The chain carries structured information of the intermediate results, enabling more accurate and reliable predictions. Chain-of-Table achieves new state-of-the-art performance on WikiTQ, FeTaQA, and TabFact benchmarks across multiple LLM choices.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

Grounded generation aims to equip language models (LMs) with the ability to produce more credible and accountable responses by accurately citing verifiable sources. However, existing methods, by either feeding LMs with raw or preprocessed materials, remain prone to errors. To address this, we introduce CaLM, a novel verification framework. CaLM leverages the insight that a robust grounded response should be consistent with information derived solely from its cited sources. Our framework empowers smaller LMs, which rely less on parametric memory and excel at processing relevant information given a query, to validate the output of larger LMs. Larger LM responses that closely align with the smaller LMs' output, which relies exclusively on cited documents, are verified. Responses showing discrepancies are iteratively refined through a feedback loop. Experiments on three open-domain question-answering datasets demonstrate significant performance gains of 1.5% to 7% absolute average without any required model fine-tuning.

Recent advances in Text-to-SQL have largely focused on the SQLite dialect, neglecting the diverse landscape of SQL dialects like BigQuery and PostgreSQL. This limitation is due to the diversity in SQL syntaxes and functions, along with the high cost of collecting and curating SQL-specific training data. To address this, we introduce SQL-GEN, a framework for generating high-quality synthetic training data for any SQL dialect, guided by readily available dialect-specific tutorials. SQL-GEN significantly improves cross-dialect Text-to-SQL performance, boosting execution accuracy by up to 20\% over existing methods. This performance gain narrows the gap with models trained on large-scale human-annotated data. Furthermore, combining synthetic data from SQL-GEN with human-annotated data yields additional improvements of up to 5.6\%. To unify multi-dialect capabilities within a single model, we propose a novel Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) initialization that leverages the shared knowledge across dialects. Our approach merges self-attention layers from dialect-specific models and initializes expert gates using dialect-specific keywords. This leads to a versatile model optimized for multiple SQL dialects, outperforming single-dialect models and significantly enhancing overall performance.