Daily Papers

We propose and test the LLM Brain Rot Hypothesis: continual exposure to junk web text induces lasting cognitive decline in large language models (LLMs). To causally isolate data quality, we run controlled experiments on real Twitter/X corpora, constructing junk and reversely controlled datasets via two orthogonal operationalizations: M1 (engagement degree) and M2 (semantic quality), with matched token scale and training operations across conditions. Contrary to the control group, continual pre-training of 4 LLMs on the junk dataset causes non-trivial declines (Hedges' g>0.3) on reasoning, long-context understanding, safety, and inflating "dark traits" (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism). The gradual mixtures of junk and control datasets also yield dose-response cognition decay: for example, under M1, ARC-Challenge with Chain Of Thoughts drops 74.9 rightarrow 57.2 and RULER-CWE 84.4 rightarrow 52.3 as junk ratio rises from 0% to 100%. Error forensics reveal several key insights. First, we identify thought-skipping as the primary lesion: models increasingly truncate or skip reasoning chains, explaining most of the error growth. Second, partial but incomplete healing is observed: scaling instruction tuning and clean data pre-training improve the declined cognition yet cannot restore baseline capability, suggesting persistent representational drift rather than format mismatch. Finally, we discover that the popularity, a non-semantic metric, of a tweet is a better indicator of the Brain Rot effect than the length in M1. Together, the results provide significant, multi-perspective evidence that data quality is a causal driver of LLM capability decay, reframing curation for continual pretraining as a training-time safety problem and motivating routine "cognitive health checks" for deployed LLMs.

This study explores the neural and behavioral consequences of LLM-assisted essay writing. Participants were divided into three groups: LLM, Search Engine, and Brain-only (no tools). Each completed three sessions under the same condition. In a fourth session, LLM users were reassigned to Brain-only group (LLM-to-Brain), and Brain-only users were reassigned to LLM condition (Brain-to-LLM). A total of 54 participants took part in Sessions 1-3, with 18 completing session 4. We used electroencephalography (EEG) to assess cognitive load during essay writing, and analyzed essays using NLP, as well as scoring essays with the help from human teachers and an AI judge. Across groups, NERs, n-gram patterns, and topic ontology showed within-group homogeneity. EEG revealed significant differences in brain connectivity: Brain-only participants exhibited the strongest, most distributed networks; Search Engine users showed moderate engagement; and LLM users displayed the weakest connectivity. Cognitive activity scaled down in relation to external tool use. In session 4, LLM-to-Brain participants showed reduced alpha and beta connectivity, indicating under-engagement. Brain-to-LLM users exhibited higher memory recall and activation of occipito-parietal and prefrontal areas, similar to Search Engine users. Self-reported ownership of essays was the lowest in the LLM group and the highest in the Brain-only group. LLM users also struggled to accurately quote their own work. While LLMs offer immediate convenience, our findings highlight potential cognitive costs. Over four months, LLM users consistently underperformed at neural, linguistic, and behavioral levels. These results raise concerns about the long-term educational implications of LLM reliance and underscore the need for deeper inquiry into AI's role in learning.

Retrieval heads, attention heads that copy information from earlier context to the current position, have been proposed as the mechanistic substrate for long-context recall. Rotary position embeddings (RoPE) rotate queries and keys by frequencies decaying with a base hyperparameter theta, and a natural hypothesis is that this rotation either prevents retrieval heads from forming or degrades their function. We test both across four open-weight 7-8B models spanning multi-head and grouped-query attention and a 100x range of theta, using paired-seed needle-in-a-haystack tests, layer-clustered permutation, and causal head-masking. (i) Retrieval heads are causally necessary: masking the 87 detected heads in OLMo-2 collapses recall from 1.00 to 0.00, while masking matched random heads has no effect; this replicates in Qwen. (ii) Higher theta does not reduce retrieval-head count (LLaMA-3.1 at theta=500K has 47 heads vs LLaMA-2 at theta=10K with 42), refuting the prevention hypothesis. (iii) The norm-utility relation is family-specific and significant in opposite directions (Qwen d=-0.49, OLMo d=+0.50, both significant; LLaMA null); since OLMo and LLaMA-3.1 share theta=500K yet differ, the effect is not theta-driven. (iv) Building on Chiang and Yogatama (2025), a controlled patch shows that zeroing the lowest-frequency RoPE dimensions of retrieval heads degrades recall dose-dependently (1.00 to 0.18 when 32 of 128 dimensions are zeroed, vs 0.98 for random dimensions); the effect is head-specific and task-specific. The causal variable is RoPE frequency, not norm-utility. The direction holds in all five models patched (OLMo-2, Qwen2.5-7B/14B, Gemma-2, Mistral) across four lineages and two scales. We do not claim cross-model magnitude. Code and a paired-seed harness are released.

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have outperformed human experts in predicting the results of neuroscience experiments (Luo et al., 2024). What is the basis for this performance? One possibility is that statistical patterns in that specific scientific literature, as opposed to emergent reasoning abilities arising from broader training, underlie LLMs' performance. To evaluate this possibility, we trained (next word prediction) a relatively small 124M-parameter GPT-2 model on 1.3 billion tokens of domain-specific knowledge. Despite being orders of magnitude smaller than larger LLMs trained on trillions of tokens, small models achieved expert-level performance in predicting neuroscience results. Small models trained on the neuroscience literature succeeded when they were trained from scratch using a tokenizer specifically trained on neuroscience text or when the neuroscience literature was used to finetune a pretrained GPT-2. Our results indicate that expert-level performance may be attained by even small LLMs through domain-specific, auto-regressive training approaches.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate human-level or even superior language abilities, effectively modeling syntactic structures, yet the specific computational modules responsible remain unclear. A key question is whether LLM behavioral capabilities stem from mechanisms akin to those in the human brain. To address these questions, we introduce the Hierarchical Frequency Tagging Probe (HFTP), a tool that utilizes frequency-domain analysis to identify neuron-wise components of LLMs (e.g., individual Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) neurons) and cortical regions (via intracranial recordings) encoding syntactic structures. Our results show that models such as GPT-2, Gemma, Gemma 2, Llama 2, Llama 3.1, and GLM-4 process syntax in analogous layers, while the human brain relies on distinct cortical regions for different syntactic levels. Representational similarity analysis reveals a stronger alignment between LLM representations and the left hemisphere of the brain (dominant in language processing). Notably, upgraded models exhibit divergent trends: Gemma 2 shows greater brain similarity than Gemma, while Llama 3.1 shows less alignment with the brain compared to Llama 2. These findings offer new insights into the interpretability of LLM behavioral improvements, raising questions about whether these advancements are driven by human-like or non-human-like mechanisms, and establish HFTP as a valuable tool bridging computational linguistics and cognitive neuroscience. This project is available at https://github.com/LilTiger/HFTP.

The rapid growth of biomedical knowledge has outpaced our ability to efficiently extract insights and generate novel hypotheses. Large language models (LLMs) have emerged as a promising tool to revolutionize knowledge interaction and potentially accelerate biomedical discovery. In this paper, we present a comprehensive evaluation of LLMs as biomedical hypothesis generators. We construct a dataset of background-hypothesis pairs from biomedical literature, carefully partitioned into training, seen, and unseen test sets based on publication date to mitigate data contamination. Using this dataset, we assess the hypothesis generation capabilities of top-tier instructed models in zero-shot, few-shot, and fine-tuning settings. To enhance the exploration of uncertainty, a crucial aspect of scientific discovery, we incorporate tool use and multi-agent interactions in our evaluation framework. Furthermore, we propose four novel metrics grounded in extensive literature review to evaluate the quality of generated hypotheses, considering both LLM-based and human assessments. Our experiments yield two key findings: 1) LLMs can generate novel and validated hypotheses, even when tested on literature unseen during training, and 2) Increasing uncertainty through multi-agent interactions and tool use can facilitate diverse candidate generation and improve zero-shot hypothesis generation performance. However, we also observe that the integration of additional knowledge through few-shot learning and tool use may not always lead to performance gains, highlighting the need for careful consideration of the type and scope of external knowledge incorporated. These findings underscore the potential of LLMs as powerful aids in biomedical hypothesis generation and provide valuable insights to guide further research in this area.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are claimed to be capable of Natural Language Inference (NLI), necessary for applied tasks like question answering and summarization. We present a series of behavioral studies on several LLM families (LLaMA, GPT-3.5, and PaLM) which probe their behavior using controlled experiments. We establish two biases originating from pretraining which predict much of their behavior, and show that these are major sources of hallucination in generative LLMs. First, memorization at the level of sentences: we show that, regardless of the premise, models falsely label NLI test samples as entailing when the hypothesis is attested in training data, and that entities are used as ``indices'' to access the memorized data. Second, statistical patterns of usage learned at the level of corpora: we further show a similar effect when the premise predicate is less frequent than that of the hypothesis in the training data, a bias following from previous studies. We demonstrate that LLMs perform significantly worse on NLI test samples which do not conform to these biases than those which do, and we offer these as valuable controls for future LLM evaluation.

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.

Scientific discoveries often hinge on synthesizing decades of research, a task that potentially outstrips human information processing capacities. Large language models (LLMs) offer a solution. LLMs trained on the vast scientific literature could potentially integrate noisy yet interrelated findings to forecast novel results better than human experts. To evaluate this possibility, we created BrainBench, a forward-looking benchmark for predicting neuroscience results. We find that LLMs surpass experts in predicting experimental outcomes. BrainGPT, an LLM we tuned on the neuroscience literature, performed better yet. Like human experts, when LLMs were confident in their predictions, they were more likely to be correct, which presages a future where humans and LLMs team together to make discoveries. Our approach is not neuroscience-specific and is transferable to other knowledge-intensive endeavors.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities on not just language tasks, but also various tasks that are not linguistic in nature, such as logical reasoning and social inference. In the human brain, neuroscience has identified a core language system that selectively and causally supports language processing. We here ask whether similar specialization for language emerges in LLMs. We identify language-selective units within 18 popular LLMs, using the same localization approach that is used in neuroscience. We then establish the causal role of these units by demonstrating that ablating LLM language-selective units -- but not random units -- leads to drastic deficits in language tasks. Correspondingly, language-selective LLM units are more aligned to brain recordings from the human language system than random units. Finally, we investigate whether our localization method extends to other cognitive domains: while we find specialized networks in some LLMs for reasoning and social capabilities, there are substantial differences among models. These findings provide functional and causal evidence for specialization in large language models, and highlight parallels with the functional organization in the brain.

Automatic disease diagnosis has become increasingly valuable in clinical practice. The advent of large language models (LLMs) has catalyzed a paradigm shift in artificial intelligence, with growing evidence supporting the efficacy of LLMs in diagnostic tasks. Despite the increasing attention in this field, a holistic view is still lacking. Many critical aspects remain unclear, such as the diseases and clinical data to which LLMs have been applied, the LLM techniques employed, and the evaluation methods used. In this article, we perform a comprehensive review of LLM-based methods for disease diagnosis. Our review examines the existing literature across various dimensions, including disease types and associated clinical specialties, clinical data, LLM techniques, and evaluation methods. Additionally, we offer recommendations for applying and evaluating LLMs for diagnostic tasks. Furthermore, we assess the limitations of current research and discuss future directions. To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive review for LLM-based disease diagnosis.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have impressive capabilities, but are prone to outputting falsehoods. Recent work has developed techniques for inferring whether a LLM is telling the truth by training probes on the LLM's internal activations. However, this line of work is controversial, with some authors pointing out failures of these probes to generalize in basic ways, among other conceptual issues. In this work, we use high-quality datasets of simple true/false statements to study in detail the structure of LLM representations of truth, drawing on three lines of evidence: 1. Visualizations of LLM true/false statement representations, which reveal clear linear structure. 2. Transfer experiments in which probes trained on one dataset generalize to different datasets. 3. Causal evidence obtained by surgically intervening in a LLM's forward pass, causing it to treat false statements as true and vice versa. Overall, we present evidence that at sufficient scale, LLMs linearly represent the truth or falsehood of factual statements. We also show that simple difference-in-mean probes generalize as well as other probing techniques while identifying directions which are more causally implicated in model outputs.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve good performance on challenging reasoning benchmarks, yet could also make basic reasoning mistakes. This contrasting behavior is puzzling when it comes to understanding the mechanisms behind LLMs' reasoning capabilities. One hypothesis is that the increasingly high and nearly saturated performance on common reasoning benchmarks could be due to the memorization of similar problems. In this paper, we systematically investigate this hypothesis with a quantitative measurement of memorization in reasoning tasks, using a dynamically generated logical reasoning benchmark based on Knights and Knaves (K&K) puzzles. We found that LLMs could interpolate the training puzzles (achieving near-perfect accuracy) after fine-tuning, yet fail when those puzzles are slightly perturbed, suggesting that the models heavily rely on memorization to solve those training puzzles. On the other hand, we show that while fine-tuning leads to heavy memorization, it also consistently improves generalization performance. In-depth analyses with perturbation tests, cross difficulty-level transferability, probing model internals, and fine-tuning with wrong answers suggest that the LLMs learn to reason on K&K puzzles despite training data memorization. This phenomenon indicates that LLMs exhibit a complex interplay between memorization and genuine reasoning abilities. Finally, our analysis with per-sample memorization score sheds light on how LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization in solving logical puzzles. Our code and data are available at https://memkklogic.github.io.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in zero-shot learning applications, generating responses to queries using only pre-training information without the need for additional fine-tuning. This represents a significant departure from traditional machine learning approaches. Previous research has indicated that LLMs may exhibit serial position effects, such as primacy and recency biases, which are well-documented cognitive biases in human psychology. Our extensive testing across various tasks and models confirms the widespread occurrence of these effects, although their intensity varies. We also discovered that while carefully designed prompts can somewhat mitigate these biases, their effectiveness is inconsistent. These findings underscore the significance of serial position effects during the inference process, particularly in scenarios where there are no ground truth labels, highlighting the need for greater focus on addressing these effects in LLM applications.

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

Do Large Language Models (LLMs) possess a Theory of Mind (ToM)? Research into this question has focused on evaluating LLMs against benchmarks and found success across a range of social tasks. However, these evaluations do not test for the actual representations posited by ToM: namely, a causal model of mental states and behavior. Here, we use a cognitively-grounded definition of ToM to develop and test a new evaluation framework. Specifically, our approach probes whether LLMs have a coherent, domain-general, and consistent model of how mental states cause behavior -- regardless of whether that model matches a human-like ToM. We find that even though LLMs succeed in approximating human judgments in a simple ToM paradigm, they fail at a logically equivalent task and exhibit low consistency between their action predictions and corresponding mental state inferences. As such, these findings suggest that the social proficiency exhibited by LLMs is not the result of an domain-general or consistent ToM.

AI holds promise for transforming scientific processes, including hypothesis generation. Prior work on hypothesis generation can be broadly categorized into theory-driven and data-driven approaches. While both have proven effective in generating novel and plausible hypotheses, it remains an open question whether they can complement each other. To address this, we develop the first method that combines literature-based insights with data to perform LLM-powered hypothesis generation. We apply our method on five different datasets and demonstrate that integrating literature and data outperforms other baselines (8.97\% over few-shot, 15.75\% over literature-based alone, and 3.37\% over data-driven alone). Additionally, we conduct the first human evaluation to assess the utility of LLM-generated hypotheses in assisting human decision-making on two challenging tasks: deception detection and AI generated content detection. Our results show that human accuracy improves significantly by 7.44\% and 14.19\% on these tasks, respectively. These findings suggest that integrating literature-based and data-driven approaches provides a comprehensive and nuanced framework for hypothesis generation and could open new avenues for scientific inquiry.

The differential diagnosis of neurodegenerative dementias is a challenging clinical task, mainly because of the overlap in symptom presentation and the similarity of patterns observed in structural neuroimaging. To improve diagnostic efficiency and accuracy, deep learning-based methods such as Convolutional Neural Networks and Vision Transformers have been proposed for the automatic classification of brain MRIs. However, despite their strong predictive performance, these models find limited clinical utility due to their opaque decision making. In this work, we propose a framework that integrates two core components to enhance diagnostic transparency. First, we introduce a modular pipeline for converting 3D T1-weighted brain MRIs into textual radiology reports. Second, we explore the potential of modern Large Language Models (LLMs) to assist clinicians in the differential diagnosis between Frontotemporal dementia subtypes, Alzheimer's disease, and normal aging based on the generated reports. To bridge the gap between predictive accuracy and explainability, we employ reinforcement learning to incentivize diagnostic reasoning in LLMs. Without requiring supervised reasoning traces or distillation from larger models, our approach enables the emergence of structured diagnostic rationales grounded in neuroimaging findings. Unlike post-hoc explainability methods that retrospectively justify model decisions, our framework generates diagnostic rationales as part of the inference process-producing causally grounded explanations that inform and guide the model's decision-making process. In doing so, our framework matches the diagnostic performance of existing deep learning methods while offering rationales that support its diagnostic conclusions.

There is increasing interest in the application large language models (LLMs) to the medical field, in part because of their impressive performance on medical exam questions. While promising, exam questions do not reflect the complexity of real patient-doctor interactions. In reality, physicians' decisions are shaped by many complex factors, such as patient compliance, personal experience, ethical beliefs, and cognitive bias. Taking a step toward understanding this, our hypothesis posits that when LLMs are confronted with clinical questions containing cognitive biases, they will yield significantly less accurate responses compared to the same questions presented without such biases. In this study, we developed BiasMedQA, a benchmark for evaluating cognitive biases in LLMs applied to medical tasks. Using BiasMedQA we evaluated six LLMs, namely GPT-4, Mixtral-8x70B, GPT-3.5, PaLM-2, Llama 2 70B-chat, and the medically specialized PMC Llama 13B. We tested these models on 1,273 questions from the US Medical Licensing Exam (USMLE) Steps 1, 2, and 3, modified to replicate common clinically-relevant cognitive biases. Our analysis revealed varying effects for biases on these LLMs, with GPT-4 standing out for its resilience to bias, in contrast to Llama 2 70B-chat and PMC Llama 13B, which were disproportionately affected by cognitive bias. Our findings highlight the critical need for bias mitigation in the development of medical LLMs, pointing towards safer and more reliable applications in healthcare.

Interpretability methods for large language models (LLMs) typically derive directions from textual supervision, which can lack external grounding. We propose using human brain activity not as a training signal but as a coordinate system for reading and steering LLM states. Using the SMN4Lang MEG dataset, we construct a word-level brain atlas of phase-locking value (PLV) patterns and extract latent axes via ICA. We validate axes with independent lexica and NER-based labels (POS/log-frequency used as sanity checks), then train lightweight adapters that map LLM hidden states to these brain axes without fine-tuning the LLM. Steering along the resulting brain-derived directions yields a robust lexical (frequency-linked) axis in a mid TinyLlama layer, surviving perplexity-matched controls, and a brain-vs-text probe comparison shows larger log-frequency shifts (relative to the text probe) with lower perplexity for the brain axis. A function/content axis (axis 13) shows consistent steering in TinyLlama, Qwen2-0.5B, and GPT-2, with PPL-matched text-level corroboration. Layer-4 effects in TinyLlama are large but inconsistent, so we treat them as secondary (Appendix). Axis structure is stable when the atlas is rebuilt without GPT embedding-change features or with word2vec embeddings (|r|=0.64-0.95 across matched axes), reducing circularity concerns. Exploratory fMRI anchoring suggests potential alignment for embedding change and log frequency, but effects are sensitive to hemodynamic modeling assumptions and are treated as population-level evidence only. These results support a new interface: neurophysiology-grounded axes provide interpretable and controllable handles for LLM behavior.

Building upon our previous investigations of O1 replication (Part 1: Journey Learning [Qin et al., 2024] and Part 2: Distillation [Huang et al., 2024]), this work explores the potential of inference-time scaling in large language models (LLMs) for medical reasoning tasks, ranging from diagnostic decision-making to treatment planning. Through extensive experiments on medical benchmarks of varying complexity (MedQA, Medbullets, and JAMA Clinical Challenges), our investigation reveals several key insights: (1) Increasing inference time does lead to improved performance. With a modest training set of 500 samples, our model yields substantial performance improvements of 6%-11%. (2) Task complexity directly correlates with the required length of reasoning chains, confirming the necessity of extended thought processes for challenging problems. (3) The differential diagnoses generated by our model adhere to the principles of the hypothetico-deductive method, producing a list of potential conditions that may explain a patient's symptoms and systematically narrowing these possibilities by evaluating the evidence. These findings demonstrate the promising synergy between inference-time scaling and journey learning in advancing LLMs' real-world clinical reasoning capabilities.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated potential in assisting scientific research, yet their ability to discover high-quality research hypotheses remains unexamined due to the lack of a dedicated benchmark. To address this gap, we introduce the first large-scale benchmark for evaluating LLMs with a near-sufficient set of sub-tasks of scientific discovery: inspiration retrieval, hypothesis composition, and hypothesis ranking. We develop an automated framework that extracts critical components - research questions, background surveys, inspirations, and hypotheses - from scientific papers across 12 disciplines, with expert validation confirming its accuracy. To prevent data contamination, we focus exclusively on papers published in 2024, ensuring minimal overlap with LLM pretraining data. Our evaluation reveals that LLMs perform well in retrieving inspirations, an out-of-distribution task, suggesting their ability to surface novel knowledge associations. This positions LLMs as "research hypothesis mines", capable of facilitating automated scientific discovery by generating innovative hypotheses at scale with minimal human intervention.

Memory is the foundation of LLMs' functionality, yet past research has lacked an in-depth exploration of their memory capabilities and underlying theory. In this paper, we apply UAT theory to explain the memory mechanism of LLMs and propose a new approach for evaluating LLM performance by comparing the memory capacities of different models. Through extensive experiments, we validate our theory and the memory abilities of LLMs. Finally, we compare the capabilities of the human brain and LLMs, highlighting both their similarities and differences in terms of working mechanisms.

Understanding how complex cognitive functions are organized within artificial systems is central to interpreting large language models (LLMs) and relating them to biological cognition. Yet although LLMs exhibit broad cognitive-like behaviours, it remains unclear whether their internal representations form reproducible functional systems that explain behaviour, failure and links to human cognition. Here we present NeuroCogMap, a cognitive neuroscience-inspired framework that organizes internal features of LLMs into functional parcels and links them to interpretable functions, cognitive capabilities and a cognitive hierarchy. These parcels form a stable and semantically coherent organization that is partly conserved across models and functionally linked to model outputs. Within this organization, major LLM failures, including hallucination, bias, refusal failure and sycophancy, correspond to distinct disruptions in representational and behavioural-control systems, yielding internal signatures for mechanism-guided detection and targeted intervention. Beyond model behaviour, NeuroCogMap improves prediction of human cortical responses during naturalistic language comprehension, with the strongest correspondence in higher-order association cortex. At the cognitive level, its internal signatures expose latent strategies that guide refinements of classical models of human decision-making. Together, these findings establish NeuroCogMap as a system-level framework for mapping functional organization in artificial systems and for relating this organization to human cortical function and cognitive behaviour.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) excel in numerous vision-language tasks yet suffer from hallucinations, producing content inconsistent with input visuals, that undermine reliability in precision-sensitive domains. This issue stems from a fundamental problem of visual neglect, where models fail to adequately prioritize input images. Existing methods typically alleviate hallucinations by intervening in the attention score or output logits, focusing on "how to intervene" but overlooking the prerequisite "when to intervene", which leads to the "over-intervention" problem and subsequently introduces new hallucinations and unnecessary computational overhead. To address this gap, we first investigate the mechanism of visual neglect and reveal it can be accurately detected via head-level activation patterns in MLLMs. We thus propose V-ITI, a lightweight visual inference-time intervention framework integrating a Visual Neglect Detector that identifies visual neglect via head-level discriminative probes and a Visual Recall Intervenor that modulates activations with prestored visual activation information only when the visual neglect is detected. Extensive experiments across eight benchmarks and different MLLM families demonstrate that V-ITI consistently mitigates vision-related hallucinations while preserving general task performance.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capability in reasoning and planning when integrated with tree-search-based prompting methods. However, since these methods ignore the previous search experiences, they often make the same mistakes in the search process. To address this issue, we introduce Reflection on search Trees (RoT), an LLM reflection framework designed to improve the performance of tree-search-based prompting methods. It uses a strong LLM to summarize guidelines from previous tree search experiences to enhance the ability of a weak LLM. The guidelines are instructions about solving this task through tree search which can prevent the weak LLMs from making similar mistakes in the past search process. In addition, we proposed a novel state selection method, which identifies the critical information from historical search processes to help RoT generate more specific and meaningful guidelines. In our extensive experiments, we find that RoT significantly improves the performance of LLMs in reasoning or planning tasks with various tree-search-based prompting methods (e.g., BFS and MCTS). Non-tree-search-based prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) can also benefit from RoT guidelines since RoT can provide task-specific knowledge collected from the search experience.

Chain-of-thought emerges as a promising technique for eliciting reasoning capabilities from Large Language Models (LLMs). However, it does not always improve task performance or accurately represent reasoning processes, leaving unresolved questions about its usage. In this paper, we diagnose the underlying mechanism by comparing the reasoning process of LLMs with humans, using causal analysis to understand the relationships between the problem instruction, reasoning, and the answer in LLMs. Our empirical study reveals that LLMs often deviate from the ideal causal chain, resulting in spurious correlations and potential consistency errors (inconsistent reasoning and answers). We also examine various factors influencing the causal structure, finding that in-context learning with examples strengthens it, while post-training techniques like supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning on human feedback weaken it. To our surprise, the causal structure cannot be strengthened by enlarging the model size only, urging research on new techniques. We hope that this preliminary study will shed light on understanding and improving the reasoning process in LLM.

Large language models (LLMs) excel on a variety of reasoning benchmarks, but previous studies suggest they sometimes struggle to generalize to unseen questions, potentially due to over-reliance on memorized training examples. However, the precise conditions under which LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization during text generation remain unclear. In this work, we provide a mechanistic understanding of LLMs' reasoning-memorization dynamics by identifying a set of linear features in the model's residual stream that govern the balance between genuine reasoning and memory recall. These features not only distinguish reasoning tasks from memory-intensive ones but can also be manipulated to causally influence model performance on reasoning tasks. Additionally, we show that intervening in these reasoning features helps the model more accurately activate the most relevant problem-solving capabilities during answer generation. Our findings offer new insights into the underlying mechanisms of reasoning and memory in LLMs and pave the way for the development of more robust and interpretable generative AI systems.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Creative thinking is a fundamental aspect of human cognition, and divergent thinking-the capacity to generate novel and varied ideas-is widely regarded as its core generative engine. Large language models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated impressive performance on divergent thinking tests and prior work has shown that models with higher task performance tend to be more aligned to human brain activity. However, existing brain-LLM alignment studies have focused on passive, non-creative tasks. Here, we explore brain alignment during creative thinking using fMRI data from 170 participants performing the Alternate Uses Task (AUT). We extract representations from LLMs varying in size (270M-72B) and measure alignment to brain responses via Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA), targeting the creativity-related default mode and frontoparietal networks. We find that brain-LLM alignment scales with model size (default mode network only) and idea originality (both networks), with effects strongest early in the creative process. We further show that post-training objectives shape alignment in functionally selective ways: a creativity-optimized Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct preserves alignment with high-creativity neural responses while reducing alignment with low-creativity ones; a human behavior fine-tuned model elevates alignment with both; and a reasoning-trained variant shows the opposite pattern, suggesting chain-of-thought training steers representations away from creative neural geometry toward analytical processing. These results demonstrate that post-training objectives selectively reshape LLM representations relative to the neural geometry of human creative thought.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been shown to be effective models of the human language system, with some models predicting most explainable variance of brain activity in current datasets. Even in untrained models, the representations induced by architectural priors can exhibit reasonable alignment to brain data. In this work, we investigate the key architectural components driving the surprising alignment of untrained models. To estimate LLM-to-brain similarity, we first select language-selective units within an LLM, similar to how neuroscientists identify the language network in the human brain. We then benchmark the brain alignment of these LLM units across five different brain recording datasets. By isolating critical components of the Transformer architecture, we identify tokenization strategy and multihead attention as the two major components driving brain alignment. A simple form of recurrence further improves alignment. We further demonstrate this quantitative brain alignment of our model by reproducing landmark studies in the language neuroscience field, showing that localized model units -- just like language voxels measured empirically in the human brain -- discriminate more reliably between lexical than syntactic differences, and exhibit similar response profiles under the same experimental conditions. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of our model's representations for language modeling, achieving improved sample and parameter efficiency over comparable architectures. Our model's estimates of surprisal sets a new state-of-the-art in the behavioral alignment to human reading times. Taken together, we propose a highly brain- and behaviorally-aligned model that conceptualizes the human language system as an untrained shallow feature encoder, with structural priors, combined with a trained decoder to achieve efficient and performant language processing.

Large language model (LLM) scaling laws are empirical formulas that estimate changes in model quality as a result of increasing parameter count and training data. However, these formulas, including the popular DeepMind Chinchilla scaling laws, neglect to include the cost of inference. We modify the Chinchilla scaling laws to calculate the optimal LLM parameter count and pre-training data size to train and deploy a model of a given quality and inference demand. We conduct our analysis both in terms of a compute budget and real-world costs and find that LLM researchers expecting reasonably large inference demand (~1B requests) should train models smaller and longer than Chinchilla-optimal.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

As the global burden of Alzheimer's disease (AD) continues to grow, early and accurate detection has become increasingly critical, especially in regions with limited access to advanced diagnostic tools. We propose BRAINS (Biomedical Retrieval-Augmented Intelligence for Neurodegeneration Screening) to address this challenge. This novel system harnesses the powerful reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) for Alzheimer's detection and monitoring. BRAINS features a dual-module architecture: a cognitive diagnostic module and a case-retrieval module. The Diagnostic Module utilizes LLMs fine-tuned on cognitive and neuroimaging datasets -- including MMSE, CDR scores, and brain volume metrics -- to perform structured assessments of Alzheimer's risk. Meanwhile, the Case Retrieval Module encodes patient profiles into latent representations and retrieves similar cases from a curated knowledge base. These auxiliary cases are fused with the input profile via a Case Fusion Layer to enhance contextual understanding. The combined representation is then processed with clinical prompts for inference. Evaluations on real-world datasets demonstrate BRAINS effectiveness in classifying disease severity and identifying early signs of cognitive decline. This system not only shows strong potential as an assistive tool for scalable, explainable, and early-stage Alzheimer's disease detection, but also offers hope for future applications in the field.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

Despite achieving high accuracy on medical benchmarks, LLMs exhibit the Einstellung Effect in clinical diagnosis--relying on statistical shortcuts rather than patient-specific evidence, causing misdiagnosis in atypical cases. Existing benchmarks fail to detect this critical failure mode. We introduce MedEinst, a counterfactual benchmark with 5,383 paired clinical cases across 49 diseases. Each pair contains a control case and a "trap" case with altered discriminative evidence that flips the diagnosis. We measure susceptibility via Bias Trap Rate--probability of misdiagnosing traps despite correctly diagnosing controls. Extensive Evaluation of 17 LLMs shows frontier models achieve high baseline accuracy but severe bias trap rates. Thus, we propose ECR-Agent, aligning LLM reasoning with Evidence-Based Medicine standard via two components: (1) Dynamic Causal Inference (DCI) performs structured reasoning through dual-pathway perception, dynamic causal graph reasoning across three levels (association, intervention, counterfactual), and evidence audit for final diagnosis; (2) Critic-Driven Graph and Memory Evolution (CGME) iteratively refines the system by storing validated reasoning paths in an exemplar base and consolidating disease-specific knowledge into evolving illness graphs. Source code is to be released.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in clinical and care settings. This exploratory study investigates whether LLMs exhibit sycophantic behavior - adapting their responses to social expectation signals rather than maintaining professional quality - in the context of dementia care. Five prompts with systematically increasing confirmatory and authority-related framing (P1 neutral to P5 authority-signaled implementation support) were submitted to four LLMs (GPT-5, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Mistral Large), each repeated five times (N = 100 responses). Responses were evaluated using an LLM-as-a-Judge methodology against seven nursing-ethical quality criteria (K1-K7) and a tone scale (0-3). All models showed significant negative Spearman correlations between prompt level and response quality (rho ranging from -0.543 to -0.734, all p < 0.01). Mistral Large exhibited the most pronounced effect (rho = -0.734), with mean scores dropping from 6.0/7 at P1 to 0.2/7 at P5. The findings suggest that LLMs pose context-sensitive risks in high-stakes care environments and that prompt framing significantly shapes response quality - a dimension that has received insufficient attention in healthcare AI deployment.

Rote learning is a memorization technique based on repetition. It is commonly believed to hinder generalization by encouraging verbatim memorization rather than deeper understanding. This insight holds for even learning factual knowledge that inevitably requires a certain degree of memorization. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs can be trained to generalize from rote memorized data. We introduce a two-phase memorize-then-generalize framework, where the model first rote memorizes factual subject-object associations using a semantically meaningless token and then learns to generalize by fine-tuning on a small set of semantically meaningful prompts. Extensive experiments over 8 LLMs show that the models can reinterpret rote memorized data through the semantically meaningful prompts, as evidenced by the emergence of structured, semantically aligned latent representations between the two. This surprising finding opens the door to both effective and efficient knowledge injection and possible risks of repurposing the memorized data for malicious usage.

Large language model (LLM) systems are increasingly used to support high-stakes decision-making, but they typically perform worse when the available evidence is internally inconsistent. Such a scenario exists in real-world healthcare settings, with patient-reported symptoms contradicting medical signs. To study this problem, we introduce MIMIC-DOS, a dataset for short-horizon organ dysfunction worsening prediction in the intensive care unit (ICU) setting. We derive this dataset from the widely recognized MIMIC-IV, a publicly available electronic health record dataset, and construct it exclusively from cases in which discordance between signs and symptoms exists. This setting poses a substantial challenge for existing LLM-based approaches, with single-pass LLMs and agentic pipelines often struggling to reconcile such conflicting signals. To address this problem, we propose CARE: a multi-stage privacy-compliant agentic reasoning framework in which a remote LLM provides guidance by generating structured categories and transitions without accessing sensitive patient data, while a local LLM uses these categories and transitions to support evidence acquisition and final decision-making. Empirically, CARE achieves stronger performance across all key metrics compared to multiple baseline settings, showing that CARE can more robustly handle conflicting clinical evidence while preserving privacy.

Instruction-tuning is a widely adopted method of finetuning that enables large language models (LLMs) to generate output that more closely resembles human responses to natural language queries, in many cases leading to human-level performance on diverse testbeds. However, it remains unclear whether instruction-tuning truly makes LLMs more similar to how humans process language. We investigate the effect of instruction-tuning on LLM-human similarity in two ways: (1) brain alignment, the similarity of LLM internal representations to neural activity in the human language system, and (2) behavioral alignment, the similarity of LLM and human behavior on a reading task. We assess 25 vanilla and instruction-tuned LLMs across three datasets involving humans reading naturalistic stories and sentences. We discover that instruction-tuning generally enhances brain alignment by an average of 6%, but does not have a similar effect on behavioral alignment. To identify the factors underlying LLM-brain alignment, we compute correlations between the brain alignment of LLMs and various model properties, such as model size, various problem-solving abilities, and performance on tasks requiring world knowledge spanning various domains. Notably, we find a strong positive correlation between brain alignment and model size (r = 0.95), as well as performance on tasks requiring world knowledge (r = 0.81). Our results demonstrate that instruction-tuning LLMs improves both world knowledge representations and brain alignment, suggesting that mechanisms that encode world knowledge in LLMs also improve representational alignment to the human brain.

Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs exhibit a basic generalization failure known as the Reversal Curse, where they struggle to learn reversible factual associations. Understanding why this occurs could help identify weaknesses in current models and advance their generalization and robustness. In this paper, we conjecture that the Reversal Curse in LLMs is a manifestation of the long-standing binding problem in cognitive science, neuroscience and AI. Specifically, we identify two primary causes of the Reversal Curse stemming from transformers' limitations in conceptual binding: the inconsistency and entanglements of concept representations. We perform a series of experiments that support these conjectures. Our exploration leads to a model design based on JEPA (Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture) that for the first time breaks the Reversal Curse without side-stepping it with specialized data augmentation or non-causal masking, and moreover, generalization could be further improved by incorporating special memory layers that support disentangled concept representations. We demonstrate that the skill of reversal unlocks a new kind of memory integration that enables models to solve large-scale arithmetic reasoning problems via parametric forward-chaining, outperforming frontier LLMs based on non-parametric memory and prolonged explicit reasoning.

Measuring the quality of responses generated by LLMs is a challenging task, particularly when it comes to evaluating whether the response is aligned with human preference. A novel approach involves using the LLM itself to make evaluation and stabilizing the results through multiple independent evaluations, similar to a single-layer narrow LLM network. This network consists of a fixed number of neurons, with each neuron being the same LLM. In this paper, we draw upon the extensive research on deep neural networks to explore whether deeper and wider networks can lead to fairer evaluations. Specifically, inspired by the observation that different neurons in a neural network are responsible for detecting different concepts, we first adaptively generate as many neuron roles as possible for each evaluation sample. Each perspective corresponds to the role of a specific LLM neuron in the first layer. In subsequent layers, we follow the idea that higher layers in deep networks are responsible for more comprehensive features, each layer receives representations from all neurons in the previous layer, integrating the locally learned evaluation information to obtain a more comprehensive evaluation result. Interestingly, this network design resembles the process of academic paper reviewing. To validate the effectiveness of our method, we construct the largest and most diverse English evaluation benchmark LLMEval^2 for LLM evaluators, comprising 15 tasks, 8 abilities, and 2,553 samples. Experimental results demonstrate that a wider network (involving many reviewers) with 2 layers (one round of discussion) performs the best, improving kappa correlation coefficient from 0.28 to 0.34. We also leverage WideDeep to aid in the assessment of Chinese LLMs, which has accelerated the evaluation time by 4.6 times, resulting in a 60% cost saving. WideDeep achieves a remarkable 93% agreement level among humans.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

Latent reasoning models (LRMs) replace explicit chain-of-thought with continuous thoughts. Recent work treats observable latent-state patterns, such as BFS-like frontiers and decodable arithmetic computation, as evidence for internal reasoning mechanisms. Evaluating two LRMs (Coconut and CODI) against controls lacking the proposed recurrence or curriculum, we find these patterns also appear in the controls and do not always causally affect behavior. Causal interventions reveal that latent-thought utilization is not binary but graded, scaling with a thought's causal effect on model behavior. Geometric analyses reveal this effect concentrates in low-rank directions whose step-to-step geometry grows more structured as their behavioral influence increases. Latent thoughts should therefore be treated as hidden computation, not hidden explanation: decodability, attention, or static structure alone cannot establish mechanism. LRM interpretability thus requires matched controls and causal tests.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into high-stakes decision-making. Inspired by the theory of inattentional blindness in human cognition, we investigate whether LLMs, trained on human-preferred corpora that embed attentional biases, exhibit a similar limitation: failing to attend to subtle yet important contextual cues under explicit task instructions. To evaluate this, we introduce the task of explicit-implicit reasoning and present MixRea, a benchmark of 2,246 multiple-choice questions across 9 reasoning types with varying distributions of explicit and implicit information. Evaluation of 21 advanced LLMs shows that even the best-performing reasoning model (Gemini 2.5 Pro) achieves only 42.8\% consistency, revealing widespread inattentional blindness. To mitigate this, we propose Potential Relation Completion Prompting (PRCP), a prompting method that improves reasoning by recovering overlooked causal relations. Further analysis shows that this limitation persists across diverse multi-source reasoning tasks, highlighting the need for more cognitively aligned models.

Incentivizing the reasoning ability of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) is essential for medical applications to transparently analyze medical scans and provide reliable diagnosis. However, existing medical MLLMs rely solely on internal knowledge during reasoning, leading to hallucinated reasoning and factual inaccuracies when encountering cases beyond their training scope. Although recent Agentic Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) methods elicit the medical model's proactive retrieval ability during reasoning, they are confined to unimodal LLMs, neglecting the crucial visual information during reasoning and retrieval. Consequently, we propose the first Multimodal Medical Reasoning-with-Retrieval framework, Med-RwR, which actively retrieves external knowledge by querying observed symptoms or domain-specific medical concepts during reasoning. Specifically, we design a two-stage reinforcement learning strategy with tailored rewards that stimulate the model to leverage both visual diagnostic findings and textual clinical information for effective retrieval. Building on this foundation, we further propose a Confidence-Driven Image Re-retrieval (CDIR) method for test-time scaling when low prediction confidence is detected. Evaluation on various public medical benchmarks demonstrates Med-RwR's significant improvements over baseline models, proving the effectiveness of enhancing reasoning capabilities with external knowledge integration. Furthermore, Med-RwR demonstrates remarkable generalizability to unfamiliar domains, evidenced by 8.8% performance gain on our proposed EchoCardiography Benchmark (ECBench), despite the scarcity of echocardiography data in the training corpus. Our data, model, and codes will be made publicly available at https://github.com/xmed-lab/Med-RwR.

For centuries, researchers have sought out ways to connect disparate areas of knowledge. While early scholars (Galileo, da Vinci, etc.) were experts across fields, specialization has taken hold later. With the advent of Artificial Intelligence, we can now explore relationships across areas (e.g., mechanics-biology) or disparate domains (e.g., failure mechanics-art). To achieve this, we use a fine-tuned Large Language Model (LLM), here for a subset of knowledge in multiscale materials failure. The approach includes the use of a general-purpose LLM to distill question-answer pairs from raw sources followed by LLM fine-tuning. The resulting MechGPT LLM foundation model is used in a series of computational experiments to explore its capacity for knowledge retrieval, various language tasks, hypothesis generation, and connecting knowledge across disparate areas. While the model has some ability to recall knowledge from training, we find that LLMs are particularly useful to extract structural insights through Ontological Knowledge Graphs. These interpretable graph structures provide explanatory insights, frameworks for new research questions, and visual representations of knowledge that also can be used in retrieval-augmented generation. Three versions of MechGPT are discussed, featuring different sizes from 13 billion to 70 billion parameters, and reaching context lengths of more than 10,000 tokens. This provides ample capacity for sophisticated retrieval augmented strategies, as well as agent-based modeling where multiple LLMs interact collaboratively and/or adversarially, the incorporation of new data from the literature or web searches, as well as multimodality.

Despite remarkable advances in the field, LLMs remain unreliable in distinguishing causation from correlation. Recent results from the Corr2Cause dataset benchmark reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs -- such as GPT-4 (F1 score: 29.08) -- only marginally outperform random baselines (Random Uniform, F1 score: 20.38), indicating limited capacity of generalization. To tackle this limitation, we propose a novel structured approach: rather than directly answering causal queries, we provide the model with the capability to structure its thinking by guiding the model to build a structured knowledge graph, systematically encoding the provided correlational premises, to answer the causal queries. This intermediate representation significantly enhances the model's causal capabilities. Experiments on the test subset of the Corr2Cause dataset benchmark with Qwen3-32B model (reasoning model) show substantial gains over standard direct prompting methods, improving F1 scores from 32.71 to 48.26 (over 47.5% relative increase), along with notable improvements in precision and recall. These results underscore the effectiveness of providing the model with the capability to structure its thinking and highlight its promising potential for broader generalization across diverse causal inference tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities but still suffer from the issue of hallucinations. A significant type of this issue is the false premise hallucination, which we define as the phenomenon when LLMs generate hallucinated text when confronted with false premise questions. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the false premise hallucination and elucidate its internal working mechanism: a small subset of attention heads (which we designate as false premise heads) disturb the knowledge extraction process, leading to the occurrence of false premise hallucination. Based on our analysis, we propose FAITH (False premise Attention head constraIining for miTigating Hallucinations), a novel and effective method to mitigate false premise hallucinations. It constrains the false premise attention heads during the model inference process. Impressively, extensive experiments demonstrate that constraining only approximately 1% of the attention heads in the model yields a notable increase of nearly 20% of model performance.

The LLM unlearning aims to eliminate the influence of undesirable data without affecting causally unrelated information. This process typically involves using a forget set to remove target information, alongside a retain set to maintain non-target capabilities. While recent localization-based methods demonstrate promise in identifying important neurons to be unlearned, they fail to disentangle neurons responsible for forgetting undesirable knowledge or retaining essential skills, often treating them as a single entangled group. As a result, these methods apply uniform interventions, risking catastrophic over-forgetting or incomplete erasure of the target knowledge. To address this, we turn to circuit discovery, a mechanistic interpretability technique, and propose the Conflict-guided Localization for LLM Unlearning framEwork (CLUE). This framework identifies the forget and retain circuit composed of important neurons, and then the circuits are transformed into conjunctive normal forms (CNF). The assignment of each neuron in the CNF satisfiability solution reveals whether it should be forgotten or retained. We then provide targeted fine-tuning strategies for different categories of neurons. Extensive experiments demonstrate that, compared to existing localization methods, CLUE achieves superior forget efficacy and retain utility through precise neural localization.

Logical reasoning consistently plays a fundamental and significant role in the domains of knowledge engineering and artificial intelligence. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a noteworthy innovation in natural language processing (NLP), exhibiting impressive achievements across various classic NLP tasks. However, the question of whether LLMs can effectively address the task of logical reasoning, which requires gradual cognitive inference similar to human intelligence, remains unanswered. To this end, we aim to bridge this gap and provide comprehensive evaluations in this paper. Firstly, to offer systematic evaluations, we select fifteen typical logical reasoning datasets and organize them into deductive, inductive, abductive and mixed-form reasoning settings. Considering the comprehensiveness of evaluations, we include three representative LLMs (i.e., text-davinci-003, ChatGPT and BARD) and evaluate them on all selected datasets under zero-shot, one-shot and three-shot settings. Secondly, different from previous evaluations relying only on simple metrics (e.g., accuracy), we propose fine-level evaluations from objective and subjective manners, covering both answers and explanations. Additionally, to uncover the logical flaws of LLMs, problematic cases will be attributed to five error types from two dimensions, i.e., evidence selection process and reasoning process. Thirdly, to avoid the influences of knowledge bias and purely focus on benchmarking the logical reasoning capability of LLMs, we propose a new dataset with neutral content. It contains 3,000 samples and covers deductive, inductive and abductive settings. Based on the in-depth evaluations, this paper finally forms a general evaluation scheme of logical reasoning capability from six dimensions. It reflects the pros and cons of LLMs and gives guiding directions for future works.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly transforming social science research by enabling the automation of labor-intensive tasks like data annotation and text analysis. However, LLM outputs vary significantly depending on the implementation choices made by researchers (e.g., model selection, prompting strategy, or temperature settings). Such variation can introduce systematic biases and random errors, which propagate to downstream analyses and cause Type I, Type II, Type S, or Type M errors. We call this LLM hacking. We quantify the risk of LLM hacking by replicating 37 data annotation tasks from 21 published social science research studies with 18 different models. Analyzing 13 million LLM labels, we test 2,361 realistic hypotheses to measure how plausible researcher choices affect statistical conclusions. We find incorrect conclusions based on LLM-annotated data in approximately one in three hypotheses for state-of-the-art models, and in half the hypotheses for small language models. While our findings show that higher task performance and better general model capabilities reduce LLM hacking risk, even highly accurate models do not completely eliminate it. The risk of LLM hacking decreases as effect sizes increase, indicating the need for more rigorous verification of findings near significance thresholds. Our extensive analysis of LLM hacking mitigation techniques emphasizes the importance of human annotations in reducing false positive findings and improving model selection. Surprisingly, common regression estimator correction techniques are largely ineffective in reducing LLM hacking risk, as they heavily trade off Type I vs. Type II errors. Beyond accidental errors, we find that intentional LLM hacking is unacceptably simple. With few LLMs and just a handful of prompt paraphrases, anything can be presented as statistically significant.

Large language models (LLMs) have a substantial capacity for high-level analogical reasoning: reproducing patterns in linear text that occur in their training data (zero-shot evaluation) or in the provided context (few-shot in-context learning). However, recent studies show that even the more advanced LLMs fail in scenarios that require reasoning over multiple objects or facts and making sequences of logical deductions. We propose a two-stage probabilistic inference paradigm, ThinkSum, which reasons over sets of objects or facts in a structured manner. In the first stage (Think - retrieval of associations), a LLM is queried in parallel over a set of phrases extracted from the prompt or an auxiliary model call. In the second stage (Sum - probabilistic inference or reasoning), the results of these queries are aggregated to make the final prediction. We demonstrate the possibilities and advantages of ThinkSum on the BIG-bench suite of LLM evaluation tasks, achieving improvements over the state of the art using GPT-family models on thirteen difficult tasks, often with far smaller model variants. We also compare and contrast ThinkSum with other proposed modifications to direct prompting of LLMs, such as variants of chain-of-thought prompting. Our results suggest that because the probabilistic inference in ThinkSum is performed outside of calls to the LLM, ThinkSum is less sensitive to prompt design, yields more interpretable predictions, and can be flexibly combined with latent variable models to extract structured knowledge from LLMs. Overall, our proposed paradigm represents a promising approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

LLMorphism is the biased belief that human cognition works like a large language model. I argue that the rise of conversational LLMs may make this bias increasingly psychologically available. When artificial systems produce human-like language, people may draw a reverse inference: if LLMs can speak like humans, perhaps humans think like LLMs. This inference is biased because similarity at the level of linguistic output does not imply similarity in cognitive architecture. Yet, LLMorphism may spread through two mechanisms: analogical transfer, whereby features of LLMs are projected onto humans, and metaphorical availability, whereby LLM vocabulary becomes a culturally salient vocabulary for describing thought. I distinguish LLMorphism from mechanomorphism, anthropomorphism, computationalism, dehumanization, objectification, and predictive-processing theories of mind. I outline its implications for work, education, responsibility, healthcare, communication, creativity, and human dignity, while also discussing boundary conditions and forms of resistance. I conclude that the public debate may be missing half of the problem: the issue is not only whether we are attributing too much mind to machines, but also whether we are beginning to attribute too little mind to humans.

Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) are excellent at generating synthetic data. However, their performance in sensitive domains such as text detoxification has not received proper attention from the scientific community. This paper explores the possibility of using LLM-generated synthetic toxic data as an alternative to human-generated data for training models for detoxification. Using Llama 3 and Qwen activation-patched models, we generated synthetic toxic counterparts for neutral texts from ParaDetox and SST-2 datasets. Our experiments show that models fine-tuned on synthetic data consistently perform worse than those trained on human data, with a drop in performance of up to 30% in joint metrics. The root cause is identified as a critical lexical diversity gap: LLMs generate toxic content using a small, repetitive vocabulary of insults that fails to capture the nuances and variety of human toxicity. These findings highlight the limitations of current LLMs in this domain and emphasize the continued importance of diverse, human-annotated data for building robust detoxification systems.

Recently, there has been a surge in the popularity of pre trained large language models (LLMs) (such as GPT-4), sweeping across the entire Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Computer Vision (CV) communities. These LLMs have demonstrated advanced multi-modal understanding capabilities and showcased strong performance across various benchmarks. The LLM has started to embody traits of artificial general intelligence, which holds vital guidance for enhancing brain-like characteristics within visual encoding models. Hence, This paper proposes a new multi-modal training paradigm, aligning with LLM, for encoding fMRI activity in visual cortex. Based on this paradigm, we trained an encoding model in fMRI data named the LLM-Visual Encoding Model (LLM-VEM). Specifically, we utilize LLM (miniGPT4) to generate descriptive text for all stimulus images, forming a high-quality textual description set. Moreover, we use the pre-trained text encoder (CLIP) to process these detailed descriptions, obtaining the text embedding features. Next, we use the contrast loss function to minimize the distance between the image embedding features and the text embedding features to complete the alignment operation of the stimulus image and text information. With the assistance of the pre-trained LLM, this alignment process facilitates better learning of the visual encoding model, resulting in higher precision. The final experimental results indicate that our training paradigm has significantly aided in enhancing the performance of the visual encoding model.

Scientific discovery contributes largely to human society's prosperity, and recent progress shows that LLMs could potentially catalyze this process. However, it is still unclear whether LLMs can discover novel and valid hypotheses in chemistry. In this work, we investigate this central research question: Can LLMs automatically discover novel and valid chemistry research hypotheses given only a chemistry research background (consisting of a research question and/or a background survey), without limitation on the domain of the research question? After extensive discussions with chemistry experts, we propose an assumption that a majority of chemistry hypotheses can be resulted from a research background and several inspirations. With this key insight, we break the central question into three smaller fundamental questions. In brief, they are: (1) given a background question, whether LLMs can retrieve good inspirations; (2) with background and inspirations, whether LLMs can lead to hypothesis; and (3) whether LLMs can identify good hypotheses to rank them higher. To investigate these questions, we construct a benchmark consisting of 51 chemistry papers published in Nature, Science, or a similar level in 2024 (all papers are only available online since 2024). Every paper is divided by chemistry PhD students into three components: background, inspirations, and hypothesis. The goal is to rediscover the hypothesis, given only the background and a large randomly selected chemistry literature corpus consisting the ground truth inspiration papers, with LLMs trained with data up to 2023. We also develop an LLM-based multi-agent framework that leverages the assumption, consisting of three stages reflecting the three smaller questions. The proposed method can rediscover many hypotheses with very high similarity with the ground truth ones, covering the main innovations.

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in reasoning tasks but face limitations in mathematical and complex logical reasoning. Existing methods to improve LLMs' logical capabilities either involve traceable or verifiable logical sequences that generate more reliable responses by constructing logical structures yet increase computational costs, or introduces rigid logic template rules, reducing flexibility. In this paper, we propose Reversal of Thought (RoT), a novel framework aimed at enhancing the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. RoT utilizes a Preference-Guided Reverse Reasoning warm-up strategy, which integrates logical symbols for pseudocode planning through meta-cognitive mechanisms and pairwise preference self-evaluation to generate task-specific prompts solely through demonstrations, aligning with LLMs' cognitive preferences shaped by Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Through reverse reasoning, we ultilize a Cognitive Preference Manager to assess knowledge boundaries and further expand LLMs' reasoning capabilities by aggregating solution logic for known tasks and stylistic templates for unknown tasks. Experiments across various tasks demonstrate that RoT surpasses existing baselines in both reasoning accuracy and efficiency.

Recent progress in the reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) has empowered them to address more complex tasks such as scientific analysis and mathematical reasoning. Despite their promise, MLLMs' reasoning abilities across different scenarios in real life remain largely unexplored and lack standardized benchmarks for evaluation. To address this gap, we introduce MMR-Life, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the diverse multimodal multi-image reasoning capabilities of MLLMs across real-life scenarios. MMR-Life consists of 2,646 multiple-choice questions based on 19,108 images primarily sourced from real-world contexts, comprehensively covering seven reasoning types: abductive, analogical, causal, deductive, inductive, spatial, and temporal. Unlike existing reasoning benchmarks, MMR-Life does not rely on domain-specific expertise but instead requires models to integrate information across multiple images and apply diverse reasoning abilities. The evaluation of 37 advanced models highlights the substantial challenge posed by MMR-Life. Even top models like GPT-5 achieve only 58% accuracy and display considerable variance in performance across reasoning types. Moreover, we analyze the reasoning paradigms of existing MLLMs, exploring how factors such as thinking length, reasoning method, and reasoning type affect their performance. In summary, MMR-Life establishes a comprehensive foundation for evaluating, analyzing, and improving the next generation of multimodal reasoning systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance in handling complex tasks requiring both extensive knowledge and reasoning abilities. However, the existing LLM inference pipeline operates as an opaque process without explicit separation between knowledge retrieval and reasoning steps, making the model's decision-making process unclear and disorganized. This ambiguity can lead to issues such as hallucinations and knowledge forgetting, which significantly impact the reliability of LLMs in high-stakes domains. In this paper, we propose a new inference paradigm that decomposes the complex inference process into two distinct and clear actions: (1) memory recall: which retrieves relevant knowledge, and (2) reasoning: which performs logical steps based on the recalled knowledge. To facilitate this decomposition, we introduce two special tokens memory and reason, guiding the model to distinguish between steps that require knowledge retrieval and those that involve reasoning. Our experiment results show that this decomposition not only improves model performance but also enhances the interpretability of the inference process, enabling users to identify sources of error and refine model responses effectively. The code is available at https://github.com/MingyuJ666/Disentangling-Memory-and-Reasoning.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) typically learn visual capacity through visual instruction tuning, involving updates to both a projector and their LLM backbones. Drawing inspiration from the concept of visual region in the human brain, we investigate the existence of an analogous visual region within LLMs that functions as a cognitive core, and explore the possibility of efficient training of LVLMs via selective layers tuning. We use Bunny-Llama-3-8B-V for detailed experiments and LLaVA-1.5-7B and LLaVA-1.5-13B for validation across a range of visual and textual tasks. Our findings reveal that selectively updating 25\% of LLMs layers, when sparsely and uniformly distributed, can preserve nearly 99\% of visual performance while maintaining or enhancing textual task results, and also effectively reducing training time. Based on this targeted training approach, we further propose a novel visual region-based pruning paradigm, removing non-critical layers outside the visual region, which can achieve minimal performance loss. This study offers an effective and efficient strategy for LVLM training and inference by activating a layer-wise visual region within LLMs, which is consistently effective across different models and parameter scales.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) hold great potential for medicine, as they inherit knowledge from LLM and allow multiple data modalities to be integrated, analysed and interpreted in natural language. However, the field of medical MLLMs is constrained by non-trivial challenges, notably the scarcity of high-quality training data and the frequent occurrence of missing data in the real-world clinical setting. Here, we propose a novel unified multimodal model, UniBrain, for brain magnetic resonance image (MRI) analysis. To address potential missing brain MRI modalities, we employ a unified training strategy to perform joint imaging modality imputation and brain image understanding. During training, an interleaved and description-enriched data flow is constructed to train the model in an autoregressive manner, enabling medical reasoning with generated multimodal data. A self-alignment strategy is introduced to leverage dense image embeddings to learn fine-grained anatomical features without requiring detailed image captions. Furthermore, we propose a dynamic hidden state mechanism to alleviate the exposure bias during long-context multimodal inference. Extensive experiments on multi-disease brain MRI dataset demonstrate that UniBrain achieves high performance for brain image imputation, understanding, and disease diagnosis under various extents of modality incompleteness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained popularity in time series forecasting, but their potential for anomaly detection remains largely unexplored. Our study investigates whether LLMs can understand and detect anomalies in time series data, focusing on zero-shot and few-shot scenarios. Inspired by conjectures about LLMs' behavior from time series forecasting research, we formulate key hypotheses about LLMs' capabilities in time series anomaly detection. We design and conduct principled experiments to test each of these hypotheses. Our investigation reveals several surprising findings about LLMs for time series: 1. LLMs understand time series better as images rather than as text 2. LLMs did not demonstrate enhanced performance when prompted to engage in explicit reasoning about time series analysis 3. Contrary to common beliefs, LLM's understanding of time series do not stem from their repetition biases or arithmetic abilities 4. LLMs' behaviors and performance in time series analysis vary significantly across different model architectures This study provides the first comprehensive analysis of contemporary LLM capabilities in time series anomaly detection. Our results suggest that while LLMs can understand time series anomalies, many common conjectures based on their reasoning capabilities do not hold. Our code and data are available at `https://github.com/Rose-STL-Lab/AnomLLM/`.

With the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs), the novel metric "Brainscore" emerged as a means to evaluate the functional similarity between LLMs and human brain/neural systems. Our efforts were dedicated to mining the meaning of the novel score by constructing topological features derived from both human fMRI data involving 190 subjects, and 39 LLMs plus their untrained counterparts. Subsequently, we trained 36 Linear Regression Models and conducted thorough statistical analyses to discern reliable and valid features from our constructed ones. Our findings reveal distinctive feature combinations conducive to interpreting existing brainscores across various brain regions of interest (ROIs) and hemispheres, thereby significantly contributing to advancing interpretable machine learning (iML) studies. The study is enriched by our further discussions and analyses concerning existing brainscores. To our knowledge, this study represents the first attempt to comprehend the novel metric brainscore within this interdisciplinary domain.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) remain unreliable on fine-grained visual perception, even when high-resolution inputs preserve the necessary local details. We identify this limitation as visual context rot: decisive evidence may exist in the full image, yet fail to be reliably selected and used amid redundant visual context. We propose LOCUS (LOcal visual CUe Search), a training framework that teaches MLLMs to internalize local evidence search through a verifiable proxy task. During training, LOCUS provides a local crop as a visual cue and optimizes the model to recover its spatial support in the full image using an IoU-based reward. The visual cue is used only during training, leaving the standard image-question inference interface unchanged. Experiments across fine-grained perception, hallucination, general understanding, and reasoning benchmarks show that LOCUS improves localization-sensitive visual understanding while preserving broad capabilities. Attention analyses further indicate stronger focus on task-relevant evidence regions, suggesting that training-time visual cue search provides an effective route to internalized fine-grained evidence selection.

To address this gap, our study introduces the concept of causal epistemic consistency, which focuses on the self-consistency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in differentiating intermediates with nuanced differences in causal reasoning. We propose a suite of novel metrics -- intensity ranking concordance, cross-group position agreement, and intra-group clustering -- to evaluate LLMs on this front. Through extensive empirical studies on 21 high-profile LLMs, including GPT-4, Claude3, and LLaMA3-70B, we have favoring evidence that current models struggle to maintain epistemic consistency in identifying the polarity and intensity of intermediates in causal reasoning. Additionally, we explore the potential of using internal token probabilities as an auxiliary tool to maintain causal epistemic consistency. In summary, our study bridges a critical gap in AI research by investigating the self-consistency over fine-grained intermediates involved in causal reasoning.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Minimal Phenomenal Experiences (MPEs) are states of consciousness in which wakefulness is preserved but phenomenal content is low or absent. The Entropic Brain Hypothesis (EBH) is a model of conscious processes that regards the entropy of spontaneous brain activity as a marker of 'phenomenal richness', exemplified by high-content psychedelic experiences (HCPEs). Yet recent human neuroimaging studies of MPEs induced by meditation -- and possibly 5-MeO-DMT -- suggest that these states, defined by their phenomenological simplicity, also show signs of increased neurophysiological entropy. This presents a conundrum for the EBH: brain entropy is elevated with increased and decreased richness of the phenomenal experience. Here, we put forward the Complex Brain Hypothesis (CBH), which proposes that the richness of experience differentiating MPEs from HCPEs is better indexed by complexity than by entropy. We argue that brain complexity is modulated by the grain of inference through which the brain resolves uncertainty: some HCPEs exemplify a fine-grained regime, in which loosened constraints amplify fluctuations into proliferating content, whereas some MPEs exemplify a coarse-grained regime, in which a simpler model dissolves variety into an experience of 'contentless' awareness. Both regimes can be associated with elevated brain entropy, but they diverge in phenomenology and perturbational signatures. By resolving the entropy-content conundrum, the CBH refines the EBH and highlights MPEs as an important test case for computational theories of consciousness.

Deduction, induction, and abduction are fundamental reasoning paradigms, core for human logical thinking. Although improving Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning has attracted significant research efforts, the extent to which the fundamental paradigms induce generalization has yet to be systematically explored. In this study, we shed light on how the interplay between these core paradigms influences LLMs' reasoning behavior. To this end, we first collect a new dataset of reasoning trajectories from symbolic tasks, each targeting one of the three fundamental paradigms, to abstract from concrete world knowledge. Then, we investigate effective ways for inducing these skills into LLMs. We experiment with a battery of methods including simple fine-tuning, and more complex approaches to increase model depth, or transform a dense model to a mixture-of-experts. We comprehensively evaluate induced models on realistic out-of-domain tasks, that are entirely formulated in natural language and contain real-world knowledge. Our results reveal that our approach yields strong generalizability with substantial performance gains (up to 14.60) across realistic tasks.

This research tests the role of Large Language Models (LLMs) as formal second opinion tools in professional decision-making, particularly focusing on complex medical cases where even experienced physicians seek peer consultation. The work analyzed 183 challenging medical cases from Medscape over a 20-month period, testing multiple LLMs' performance against crowd-sourced physician responses. A key finding was the high overall score possible in the latest foundational models (>80% accuracy compared to consensus opinion), which exceeds most human metrics reported on the same clinical cases (450 pages of patient profiles, test results). The study rates the LLMs' performance disparity between straightforward cases (>81% accuracy) and complex scenarios (43% accuracy), particularly in these cases generating substantial debate among human physicians. The research demonstrates that LLMs may be valuable as generators of comprehensive differential diagnoses rather than as primary diagnostic tools, potentially helping to counter cognitive biases in clinical decision-making, reduce cognitive loads, and thus remove some sources of medical error. The inclusion of a second comparative legal dataset (Supreme Court cases, N=21) provides added empirical context to the AI use to foster second opinions, though these legal challenges proved considerably easier for LLMs to analyze. In addition to the original contributions of empirical evidence for LLM accuracy, the research aggregated a novel benchmark for others to score highly contested question and answer reliability between both LLMs and disagreeing human practitioners. These results suggest that the optimal deployment of LLMs in professional settings may differ substantially from current approaches that emphasize automation of routine tasks.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise in biomedicine but lack true causal understanding, relying instead on correlations. This paper envisions causal LLM agents that integrate multimodal data (text, images, genomics, etc.) and perform intervention-based reasoning to infer cause-and-effect. Addressing this requires overcoming key challenges: designing safe, controllable agentic frameworks; developing rigorous benchmarks for causal evaluation; integrating heterogeneous data sources; and synergistically combining LLMs with structured knowledge (KGs) and formal causal inference tools. Such agents could unlock transformative opportunities, including accelerating drug discovery through automated hypothesis generation and simulation, enabling personalized medicine through patient-specific causal models. This research agenda aims to foster interdisciplinary efforts, bridging causal concepts and foundation models to develop reliable AI partners for biomedical progress.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit logically inconsistent hallucinations that appear coherent yet violate reasoning principles, with recent research suggesting an inverse relationship between causal reasoning capabilities and such hallucinations. However, existing reasoning approaches in LLMs, such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and its graph-based variants, operate at the linguistic token level rather than modeling the underlying causal relationships between variables, lacking the ability to represent conditional independencies or satisfy causal identification assumptions. To bridge this gap, we introduce causal-DAG construction and reasoning (CDCR-SFT), a supervised fine-tuning framework that trains LLMs to explicitly construct variable-level directed acyclic graph (DAG) and then perform reasoning over it. Moreover, we present a dataset comprising 25,368 samples (CausalDR), where each sample includes an input question, explicit causal DAG, graph-based reasoning trace, and validated answer. Experiments on four LLMs across eight tasks show that CDCR-SFT improves the causal reasoning capability with the state-of-the-art 95.33% accuracy on CLADDER (surpassing human performance of 94.8% for the first time) and reduces the hallucination on HaluEval with 10% improvements. It demonstrates that explicit causal structure modeling in LLMs can effectively mitigate logical inconsistencies in LLM outputs. Code is available at https://github.com/MrLYG/CDCR-SFT.

Multimodal hallucination in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) restricts the correctness of MLLMs. However, multimodal hallucinations are multi-sourced and arise from diverse causes. Existing benchmarks fail to adequately distinguish between perception-induced hallucinations and reasoning-induced hallucinations. This failure constitutes a significant issue and hinders the diagnosis of multimodal reasoning failures within MLLMs. To address this, we propose the {\dataset} benchmark, which isolates reasoning hallucinations by constructing questions where input images are correctly perceived by MLLMs yet reasoning errors persist. {\dataset} introduces multi-granular evaluation metrics: accuracy, factuality, and LLMs hallucination score for hallucination quantification. Our analysis reveals that (1) the model scale, data scale, and training stages significantly affect the degree of logical, fabrication, and factual hallucinations; (2) current MLLMs show no effective improvement on spatial hallucinations caused by misinterpreted spatial relationships, indicating their limited visual reasoning capabilities; and (3) question types correlate with distinct hallucination patterns, highlighting targeted challenges and potential mitigation strategies. To address these challenges, we propose {\method}, a method that combines curriculum reinforcement fine-tuning to encourage models to generate logic-consistent reasoning chains by stepwise reducing learning difficulty, and collaborative hint inference to reduce reasoning complexity. {\method} establishes a baseline on {\dataset}, and reduces the logical hallucinations in original base models.

The growing adoption of machine learning (ML) in sensitive domains has heightened the demand for transparent and interpretable artificial intelligence. Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly capable of producing natural language explanations, yet it remains unclear whether these rationales faithfully capture the predictive signals that underlie decisions. This paper introduces RACE-Reasoning Alignment for Completeness of Explanations, a systematic framework to evaluate the alignment between LLM-generated explanations and interpretable feature importance scores derived from a logistic regression baseline. We analyze four widely used text classification datasets-WIKI ONTOLOGY, AG NEWS, IMDB, and GOEMOTIONS-and compare LLM rationales against top-ranked supporting and contradicting lexical features. To capture alignment at multiple levels of granularity, RACE implements token-aware, exact string, and edit-distance matching techniques. Empirical results reveal a consistent asymmetry: correct predictions exhibit higher coverage of supporting features, while incorrect predictions are associated with elevated coverage of contradicting features. Edit-distance matching further uncovers paraphrastic overlaps, boosting coverage while preserving this asymmetry. These findings demonstrate that LLM rationales combine both surface-level and flexible evidence reuse, yet can also amplify misleading cues in error cases. RACE provides new insights into the faithfulness of LLM explanations and establishes a quantitative basis for evaluating reasoning completeness in neural language models.

Analogical reasoning is at the core of human cognition, serving as an important foundation for a variety of intellectual activities. While prior work has shown that LLMs can represent task patterns and surface-level concepts, it remains unclear whether these models can encode high-level relational concepts and apply them to novel situations through structured comparisons. In this work, we explore this fundamental aspect using proportional and story analogies, and identify three key findings. First, LLMs effectively encode the underlying relationships between analogous entities; both attributive and relational information propagate through mid-upper layers in correct cases, whereas reasoning failures reflect missing relational information within these layers. Second, unlike humans, LLMs often struggle not only when relational information is missing, but also when attempting to apply it to new entities. In such cases, strategically patching hidden representations at critical token positions can facilitate information transfer to a certain extent. Lastly, successful analogical reasoning in LLMs is marked by strong structural alignment between analogous situations, whereas failures often reflect degraded or misplaced alignment. Overall, our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit emerging but limited capabilities in encoding and applying high-level relational concepts, highlighting both parallels and gaps with human cognition.

While large language models have shown impressive capabilities across a wide range of domains, they still encounter significant challenges in reasoning tasks that require gathering evidence over multiple turns and drawing logical conclusions. These challenges present significant obstacles for LLM chat user interfaces, which rely on multi-turn interactions to facilitate effective collaboration. This limitation leads to real-world issues; for example, service chatbots must gather necessary information from customers over multiple turns to diagnose and resolve problems effectively. Despite the multi-turn nature of many real-world LLM use cases, most existing benchmarks rely on carefully curated single-turn tests, which often blur the line between memorization and genuine reasoning. To address this, we introduce the Wason Inductive Logic Test (WILT), a simple yet challenging multi-turn reasoning benchmark designed to resist memorization. WILT is inspired by the Wason 2-4-6 task, where participants must infer a boolean function involving three variables (e.g., x < y < z) by proposing test cases (such as (2, 4, 6)). In WILT, each test starts from a clean slate, with only the initial instructions provided, preventing models from relying on pre-learned responses. Over several turns, models must interact with the environment by suggesting test cases to narrow the possible hypotheses and ultimately infer the hidden function based on the outcomes. Our findings reveal that LLMs struggle with this task, exhibiting distinct strengths and weaknesses: some are better at narrowing down the hypothesis space by proposing valuable test cases, while others are more adept at deducing the hidden function from observed cases. Despite these variations, the best-performing model achieves only 28% accuracy, highlighting a significant gap in LLM performance on complex multi-turn reasoning tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) offer a promising pre-screening tool, improving early disease detection and providing enhanced healthcare access for underprivileged communities. The early diagnosis of various diseases continues to be a significant challenge in healthcare, primarily due to the nonspecific nature of early symptoms, the shortage of expert medical practitioners, and the need for prolonged clinical evaluations, all of which can delay treatment and adversely affect patient outcomes. With impressive accuracy in prediction across a range of diseases, LLMs have the potential to revolutionize clinical pre-screening and decision-making for various medical conditions. In this work, we study the diagnostic capability of LLMs for Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA) with real world patients data. Patient data was collected alongside diagnoses from medical experts, and the performance of LLMs was evaluated in comparison to expert diagnoses for RA disease prediction. We notice an interesting pattern in disease diagnosis and find an unexpected misalignment between prediction and explanation. We conduct a series of multi-round analyses using different LLM agents. The best-performing model accurately predicts rheumatoid arthritis (RA) diseases approximately 95\% of the time. However, when medical experts evaluated the reasoning generated by the model, they found that nearly 68\% of the reasoning was incorrect. This study highlights a clear misalignment between LLMs high prediction accuracy and its flawed reasoning, raising important questions about relying on LLM explanations in clinical settings. LLMs provide incorrect reasoning to arrive at the correct answer for RA disease diagnosis.

Root cause analysis (RCA) is essential for diagnosing failures within complex software systems to ensure system reliability. The highly distributed and interdependent nature of modern cloud-based systems often complicates RCA efforts, particularly for multi-hop fault propagation, where symptoms appear far from their true causes. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) present new opportunities to enhance automated RCA. However, their practical value for RCA depends on the fidelity of reasoning and decision-making. Existing work relies on historical incident corpora, operates directly on high-volume telemetry beyond current LLM capacity, or embeds reasoning inside complex multi-agent pipelines -- conditions that obscure whether failures arise from reasoning itself or from peripheral design choices. We present a focused empirical evaluation that isolates an LLM's reasoning behavior. We design a controlled experimental framework that foregrounds the LLM by using a simplified experimental setting. We evaluate six LLMs under two agentic workflows (ReAct and Plan-and-Execute) and a non-agentic baseline on two real-world case studies (GAIA and OpenRCA). In total, we executed 48,000 simulated failure scenarios, totaling 228 days of execution time. We measure both root-cause accuracy and the quality of intermediate reasoning traces. We produce a labeled taxonomy of 16 common RCA reasoning failures and use an LLM-as-a-Judge for annotation. Our results clarify where current open-source LLMs succeed and fail in multi-hop RCA, quantify sensitivity to input data modalities, and identify reasoning failures that predict final correctness. Together, these contributions provide transparent and reproducible empirical results and a failure taxonomy to guide future work on reasoning-driven system diagnosis.

Large Language Models (LLM) are prone to returning false information. It constitutes one of major challenges in the AI field. In our work, we explore paradigm introduced by Inference-Time-Intervention (ITI). In first stage, it identifies attention heads, which contain the highest amount of desired type of knowledge (e.g., truthful). Afterwards, during inference, LLM activations are shifted for chosen subset of attention heads. We further improved the ITI framework by introducing a nonlinear probing and multi-token intervention - Non-Linear ITI (NL-ITI). NL-ITI is tested on diverse multiple-choice benchmarks, including TruthfulQA, on which we report around 14% MC1 metric improvement with respect to the baseline ITI results. NL-ITI achieves also encouraging results on other testsets - on Business Ethics subdomain of MMLU, around 18% MC1 improvement over baseline LLaMA2-7B. Additionally, NL-ITI performs better while being less invasive in the behavior of LLM at the same time (as measured by Kullback-Leibler divergence).

Why do large language models sometimes output factual inaccuracies and exhibit erroneous reasoning? The brittleness of these models, particularly when executing long chains of reasoning, currently seems to be an inevitable price to pay for their advanced capabilities of coherently synthesizing knowledge, pragmatics, and abstract thought. Towards making sense of this fundamentally unsolved problem, this work identifies and analyzes the phenomenon of attention glitches, in which the Transformer architecture's inductive biases intermittently fail to capture robust reasoning. To isolate the issue, we introduce flip-flop language modeling (FFLM), a parametric family of synthetic benchmarks designed to probe the extrapolative behavior of neural language models. This simple generative task requires a model to copy binary symbols over long-range dependencies, ignoring the tokens in between. We find that Transformer FFLMs suffer from a long tail of sporadic reasoning errors, some of which we can eliminate using various regularization techniques. Our preliminary mechanistic analyses show why the remaining errors may be very difficult to diagnose and resolve. We hypothesize that attention glitches account for (some of) the closed-domain hallucinations in natural LLMs.

Recent work shows that LLM agents struggle to correct errors in their own reasoning traces yet show markedly higher correction rates when identical claims appear under external sources. We ask whether this asymmetry reflects a capability deficit or a role-label artifact: does an agent's willingness to correct a wrong claim depend causally on the chat-template role that carries it, rather than on the claim's content? Our setup keeps the erroneous claim byte-identical across all conditions (SHA-256 verified) and varies only its wrapping role: the agent's own <thought>, a user message, a tool response, or a system <memory> block. Across 13 model-domain cells covering seven model families and three domains (n{=}30 paired tasks per cell), relabeling the claim from <thought> to an external role lifts the explicit-correction rate by 23 to 93 percentage points, with 10 of 13 cells reaching p{<}0.001. Further experiments confirm that the effect is asymmetric, mechanistically decomposable, and robust across domains. The failure to self-correct is not a cognitive deficit; it is a chat-template artifact. We exploit this artifact by designing a prompt-structure-only intervention that requires no training and no model modification, with its strongest role label being domain-dependent: <memory> dominates on math, while a plain user message dominates on logical deduction.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

Large language models (LLMs) undergo a three-phase training process: unsupervised pre-training, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and learning from human feedback (RLHF/DPO). Notably, it is during the final phase that these models are exposed to negative examples -- incorrect, rejected, or suboptimal responses to queries. This paper delves into the role of negative examples in the training of LLMs, using a likelihood-ratio (Likra) model on multiple-choice question answering benchmarks to precisely manage the influence and the volume of negative examples. Our findings reveal three key insights: (1) During a critical phase in training, Likra with negative examples demonstrates a significantly larger improvement per training example compared to SFT using only positive examples. This leads to a sharp jump in the learning curve for Likra unlike the smooth and gradual improvement of SFT; (2) negative examples that are plausible but incorrect (near-misses) exert a greater influence; and (3) while training with positive examples fails to significantly decrease the likelihood of plausible but incorrect answers, training with negative examples more accurately identifies them. These results indicate a potentially significant role for negative examples in improving accuracy and reducing hallucinations for LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have reshaped our world with significant advancements in science, engineering, and society through applications ranging from scientific discoveries and medical diagnostics to Chatbots. Despite their ubiquity and utility, the underlying mechanisms of LLM remain concealed within billions of parameters and complex structures, making their inner architecture and cognitive processes challenging to comprehend. We address this gap by adopting approaches to understanding emerging cognition in biology and developing a network-based framework that links cognitive skills, LLM architectures, and datasets, ushering in a paradigm shift in foundation model analysis. The skill distribution in the module communities demonstrates that while LLMs do not strictly parallel the focalized specialization observed in specific biological systems, they exhibit unique communities of modules whose emergent skill patterns partially mirror the distributed yet interconnected cognitive organization seen in avian and small mammalian brains. Our numerical results highlight a key divergence from biological systems to LLMs, where skill acquisition benefits substantially from dynamic, cross-regional interactions and neural plasticity. By integrating cognitive science principles with machine learning, our framework provides new insights into LLM interpretability and suggests that effective fine-tuning strategies should leverage distributed learning dynamics rather than rigid modular interventions.

Catastrophic forgetting (CF) is a phenomenon that occurs in machine learning when a model forgets previously learned information while acquiring new knowledge for achieving a satisfactory performance in downstream tasks. As large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance, it is intriguing to investigate whether CF exists during the continual instruction tuning of LLMs. This study empirically evaluates the forgetting phenomenon in LLMs' knowledge during continual instruction tuning from the perspectives of domain knowledge, reasoning, and reading comprehension. The experiments reveal that catastrophic forgetting is generally observed in LLMs ranging from 1b to 7b parameters. Surprisingly, as the model scale increases, the severity of forgetting intensifies in such a model sale range which may result from the much significant initial performance in the larger LLM. Comparing the decoder-only model BLOOMZ with the encoder-decoder model mT0, BLOOMZ exhibits less forgetting and retains more knowledge. Interestingly, we also observe that LLMs can mitigate language biases, such as gender bias, during continual fine-tuning. Furthermore, our findings indicate that general instruction tuning can help alleviate the forgetting phenomenon in LLMs during subsequent fine-tuning.

Developmental psychologists have spent decades devising experiments to test the intelligence and knowledge of infants and children, tracing the origin of crucial concepts and capacities. Moreover, experimental techniques in developmental psychology have been carefully designed to discriminate the cognitive capacities that underlie particular behaviors. We propose that using classical experiments from child development is a particularly effective way to probe the computational abilities of AI models, in general, and LLMs in particular. First, the methodological techniques of developmental psychology, such as the use of novel stimuli to control for past experience or control conditions to determine whether children are using simple associations, can be equally helpful for assessing the capacities of LLMs. In parallel, testing LLMs in this way can tell us whether the information that is encoded in text is sufficient to enable particular responses, or whether those responses depend on other kinds of information, such as information from exploration of the physical world. In this work we adapt classical developmental experiments to evaluate the capabilities of LaMDA, a large language model from Google. We propose a novel LLM Response Score (LRS) metric which can be used to evaluate other language models, such as GPT. We find that LaMDA generates appropriate responses that are similar to those of children in experiments involving social understanding, perhaps providing evidence that knowledge of these domains is discovered through language. On the other hand, LaMDA's responses in early object and action understanding, theory of mind, and especially causal reasoning tasks are very different from those of young children, perhaps showing that these domains require more real-world, self-initiated exploration and cannot simply be learned from patterns in language input.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated good performance in many reasoning tasks, but they still struggle with some complicated reasoning tasks including logical reasoning. One non-negligible reason for LLMs' suboptimal performance on logical reasoning is their overlooking of understanding logical fallacies correctly. To evaluate LLMs' capability of logical fallacy understanding (LFU), we propose five concrete tasks from three cognitive dimensions of WHAT, WHY, and HOW in this paper. Towards these LFU tasks, we have successfully constructed a new dataset LFUD based on GPT-4 accompanied by a little human effort. Our extensive experiments justify that our LFUD can be used not only to evaluate LLMs' LFU capability, but also to fine-tune LLMs to obtain significantly enhanced performance on logical reasoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated great potential as generalist assistants, showcasing powerful task understanding and problem-solving capabilities. To deploy LLMs as AI assistants, it is crucial that these models exhibit desirable behavioral traits, such as non-toxicity and resilience against jailbreak attempts. Current methods for detoxification or preventing jailbreaking usually involve Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) or Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), which requires finetuning billions of parameters through gradient descent with substantial computation cost. Furthermore, models modified through SFT and RLHF may deviate from the pretrained models, potentially leading to a degradation in foundational LLM capabilities. In this paper, we observe that surprisingly, directly editing a small subset of parameters can effectively modulate specific behaviors of LLMs, such as detoxification and resistance to jailbreaking. Specifically, for a behavior that we aim to avoid, we employ a linear classifier, which we term the behavior probe, to classify binary behavior labels within the hidden state space of the LLM. Using this probe, we introduce an algorithm to identify a critical subset of LLM parameters that significantly influence this targeted behavior. Then we directly edit these selected parameters by shifting them towards the behavior probe. Such a direct parameter editing method necessitates only inference-level computational resources. Experiments demonstrate that in the representative detoxification task, our approach achieves reductions of up to 90.0\% in toxicity on the RealToxicityPrompts dataset and 49.2\% on ToxiGen, while maintaining the LLM's general capabilities in areas such as common sense, question answering, and mathematics. Our code is available at https://github.com/lucywang720/model-surgery.

Dominant accuracy evaluation might reward unwarranted guessing of Large Language Models, and it might not be applicable to novel tasks for model validation without ground-truth (gt) annotation. Based on basic logic principle, we propose a novel framework to evaluate the vision-language logical consistency of MLLMs on both sufficient and necessary cause-effect relations. We define Vision-Language Logical Consistency Metric (VL-LCM) on traditional MC-VQA tests, and recent NaturalBench tests without the need for gt annotation. Through systematic experiments on representative VL benchmark MMMU and recent VL challenges like NaturalBench, we evaluated 11 recent open-source MLLMs from 4 frontier families. Our findings reveal that, despite significant progress of recent MLLMs on accuracy, logical consistency lags behind significantly. Extensive evaluations on the correlations of VL-LCM with metrics on gt, the reliability of LCM, and the relation of VL-LCM with response distribution justify the validity and applicability of VL-LCM even without gt annotation. Our findings suggest that, beyond accuracy, logical consistency could be employed for both accuracy and reliability. VL-LCM can also be employed for MLLM selection, validation, and reliable answer justification in novel tasks without gt annotation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

Large Language Models (LLMs) perpetuate social biases, reflecting prejudices in their training data and reinforcing societal stereotypes and inequalities. Our work explores the potential of the Contact Hypothesis, a concept from social psychology for debiasing LLMs. We simulate various forms of social contact through LLM prompting to measure their influence on the model's biases, mirroring how intergroup interactions can reduce prejudices in social contexts. We create a dataset of 108,000 prompts following a principled approach replicating social contact to measure biases in three LLMs (LLaMA 2, Tulu, and NousHermes) across 13 social bias dimensions. We propose a unique debiasing technique, Social Contact Debiasing (SCD), that instruction-tunes these models with unbiased responses to prompts. Our research demonstrates that LLM responses exhibit social biases when subject to contact probing, but more importantly, these biases can be significantly reduced by up to 40% in 1 epoch of instruction tuning LLaMA 2 following our SCD strategy. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/chahatraj/breakingbias.

Recent advances in Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) lead to significant breakthroughs in both academia and industry. One question that arises is how we, as humans, can understand their internal neural representations. This paper takes an initial step towards addressing this question by presenting a versatile framework to identify and interpret the semantics within LMMs. Specifically, 1) we first apply a Sparse Autoencoder(SAE) to disentangle the representations into human understandable features. 2) We then present an automatic interpretation framework to interpreted the open-semantic features learned in SAE by the LMMs themselves. We employ this framework to analyze the LLaVA-NeXT-8B model using the LLaVA-OV-72B model, demonstrating that these features can effectively steer the model's behavior. Our results contribute to a deeper understanding of why LMMs excel in specific tasks, including EQ tests, and illuminate the nature of their mistakes along with potential strategies for their rectification. These findings offer new insights into the internal mechanisms of LMMs and suggest parallels with the cognitive processes of the human brain.

Large Language Models (LLMs) display striking surface fluency yet systematically fail at tasks requiring symbolic reasoning, arithmetic accuracy, and logical consistency. This paper offers a structural diagnosis of such failures, revealing a persistent gap between comprehension and competence. Through controlled experiments and architectural analysis, we demonstrate that LLMs often articulate correct principles without reliably applying them--a failure rooted not in knowledge access, but in computational execution. We term this phenomenon the computational split-brain syndrome, where instruction and action pathways are geometrically and functionally dissociated. This core limitation recurs across domains, from mathematical operations to relational inferences, and explains why model behavior remains brittle even under idealized prompting. We argue that LLMs function as powerful pattern completion engines, but lack the architectural scaffolding for principled, compositional reasoning. Our findings delineate the boundary of current LLM capabilities and motivate future models with metacognitive control, principle lifting, and structurally grounded execution. This diagnosis also clarifies why mechanistic interpretability findings may reflect training-specific pattern coordination rather than universal computational principles, and why the geometric separation between instruction and execution pathways suggests limitations in neural introspection and mechanistic analysis.

Large language models exhibit high-level commonsense reasoning abilities, especially with enhancement methods like Chain-of-Thought (CoT). However, we find these CoT-like methods lead to a considerable number of originally correct answers turning wrong, which we define as the Toxic CoT problem. To interpret and mitigate this problem, we first utilize attribution tracing and causal tracing methods to probe the internal working mechanism of the LLM during CoT reasoning. Through comparisons, we prove that the model exhibits information loss from the question over the shallow attention layers when generating rationales or answers. Based on the probing findings, we design a novel method called RIDERS (Residual decodIng and sERial-position Swap), which compensates for the information deficit in the model from both decoding and serial-position perspectives. Through extensive experiments on multiple commonsense reasoning benchmarks, we validate that this method not only significantly eliminates Toxic CoT problems (decreased by 23.6%), but also effectively improves the model's overall commonsense reasoning performance (increased by 5.5%).

Large Language Models (LLMs) are extensively used today across various sectors, including academia, research, business, and finance, for tasks such as text generation, summarization, and translation. Despite their widespread adoption, these models often produce incorrect and misleading information, exhibiting a tendency to hallucinate. This behavior can be attributed to several factors, with consistency and reasoning capabilities being significant contributors. LLMs frequently lack the ability to generate explanations and engage in coherent reasoning, leading to inaccurate responses. Moreover, they exhibit inconsistencies in their outputs. This paper aims to evaluate and compare the consistency and reasoning capabilities of both public and proprietary LLMs. The experiments utilize the Boolq dataset as the ground truth, comprising questions, answers, and corresponding explanations. Queries from the dataset are presented as prompts to the LLMs, and the generated responses are evaluated against the ground truth answers. Additionally, explanations are generated to assess the models' reasoning abilities. Consistency is evaluated by repeatedly presenting the same query to the models and observing for variations in their responses. For measuring reasoning capabilities, the generated explanations are compared to the ground truth explanations using metrics such as BERT, BLEU, and F-1 scores. The findings reveal that proprietary models generally outperform public models in terms of both consistency and reasoning capabilities. However, even when presented with basic general knowledge questions, none of the models achieved a score of 90\% in both consistency and reasoning. This study underscores the direct correlation between consistency and reasoning abilities in LLMs and highlights the inherent reasoning challenges present in current language models.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to internalize human-like biases during finetuning, yet the mechanisms by which these biases manifest remain unclear. In this work, we investigated whether the well-known Knobe effect, a moral bias in intentionality judgements, emerges in finetuned LLMs and whether it can be traced back to specific components of the model. We conducted a Layer-Patching analysis across 3 open-weights LLMs and demonstrated that the bias is not only learned during finetuning but also localized in a specific set of layers. Surprisingly, we found that patching activations from the corresponding pretrained model into just a few critical layers is sufficient to eliminate the effect. Our findings offer new evidence that social biases in LLMs can be interpreted, localized, and mitigated through targeted interventions, without the need for model retraining.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities, yet they struggle with spatial tasks that require mental simulation, such as mental rotation. This paper investigates whether equipping an LLM with an external ``Imagery Module'' -- a tool capable of rendering and rotating 3D models -- can bridge this gap, functioning as a ``cognitive prosthetic.'' We conducted experiments using a dual-module architecture in which a reasoning module (an MLLM) interacts with an imagery module on 3D model rotation tasks. Performance was lower than expected, with accuracy reaching at most 62.5%. Further investigation suggests that even when the burden of maintaining and manipulating a holistic 3D state is outsourced, the system still fails. This reveals that current frontier models lack the foundational visual-spatial primitives required to interface with imagery. Specifically, they lack: (1) the low-level sensitivity to extract spatial signals such as (a) depth, (b) motion, and (c) short-horizon dynamic prediction; and (2) the capacity to reason contemplatively over images, dynamically shifting visual focus and balancing imagery with symbolic and associative information.

Despite the potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) in medicine, they may generate responses lacking supporting evidence or based on hallucinated evidence. While Retrieval Augment Generation (RAG) is popular to address this issue, few studies implemented and evaluated RAG in downstream domain-specific applications. We developed a RAG pipeline with 70,000 ophthalmology-specific documents that retrieve relevant documents to augment LLMs during inference time. In a case study on long-form consumer health questions, we systematically evaluated the responses including over 500 references of LLMs with and without RAG on 100 questions with 10 healthcare professionals. The evaluation focuses on factuality of evidence, selection and ranking of evidence, attribution of evidence, and answer accuracy and completeness. LLMs without RAG provided 252 references in total. Of which, 45.3% hallucinated, 34.1% consisted of minor errors, and 20.6% were correct. In contrast, LLMs with RAG significantly improved accuracy (54.5% being correct) and reduced error rates (18.8% with minor hallucinations and 26.7% with errors). 62.5% of the top 10 documents retrieved by RAG were selected as the top references in the LLM response, with an average ranking of 4.9. The use of RAG also improved evidence attribution (increasing from 1.85 to 2.49 on a 5-point scale, P<0.001), albeit with slight decreases in accuracy (from 3.52 to 3.23, P=0.03) and completeness (from 3.47 to 3.27, P=0.17). The results demonstrate that LLMs frequently exhibited hallucinated and erroneous evidence in the responses, raising concerns for downstream applications in the medical domain. RAG substantially reduced the proportion of such evidence but encountered challenges.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown significant potential in scientific disciplines such as biomedicine, particularly in hypothesis generation, where they can analyze vast literature, identify patterns, and suggest research directions. However, a key challenge lies in evaluating the truthfulness of generated hypotheses, as verifying their accuracy often requires substantial time and resources. Additionally, the hallucination problem in LLMs can lead to the generation of hypotheses that appear plausible but are ultimately incorrect, undermining their reliability. To facilitate the systematic study of these challenges, we introduce TruthHypo, a benchmark for assessing the capabilities of LLMs in generating truthful biomedical hypotheses, and KnowHD, a knowledge-based hallucination detector to evaluate how well hypotheses are grounded in existing knowledge. Our results show that LLMs struggle to generate truthful hypotheses. By analyzing hallucinations in reasoning steps, we demonstrate that the groundedness scores provided by KnowHD serve as an effective metric for filtering truthful hypotheses from the diverse outputs of LLMs. Human evaluations further validate the utility of KnowHD in identifying truthful hypotheses and accelerating scientific discovery. Our data and source code are available at https://github.com/Teddy-XiongGZ/TruthHypo.

Background Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a leading cause of global disability, yet current diagnostic approaches often rely on subjective assessments and lack the ability to integrate multimodal clinical information. Large language models (LLMs) hold promise for enhancing diagnostic accuracy through advanced reasoning but face challenges in interpretability, hallucination, and reliance on synthetic data. Methods We developed MDD-Thinker, an LLM-based diagnostic framework that integrates supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with reinforcement learning (RL) to strengthen reasoning ability and interpretability. Using the UK Biobank dataset, we generated 40,000 reasoning samples, supplemented with 10,000 samples from publicly available mental health datasets. The model was fine-tuned on these reasoning corpora, and its diagnostic and reasoning performance was evaluated against machine learning, deep learning, and state-of-the-art LLM baselines. Findings MDD-Thinker achieved an accuracy of 0.8268 and F1-score of 0.8081, significantly outperforming traditional baselines such as SVM and MLP, as well as general-purpose LLMs. Incorporating both SFT and RL yielded the greatest improvements, with relative gains of 29.0% in accuracy, 38.1% in F1-score, and 34.8% in AUC. Moreover, the model demonstrated comparable reasoning performance compared to much larger LLMs, while maintaining computational efficiency. Interpretation This study presents the first reasoning-enhanced LLM framework for MDD diagnosis trained on large-scale real-world clinical data. By integrating SFT and RL, MDD-Thinker balances accuracy, interpretability, and efficiency, offering a scalable approach for intelligent psychiatric diagnostics. These findings suggest that reasoning-oriented LLMs can provide clinically reliable support for MDD detection and may inform broader applications in mental health care.

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has marked a significant breakthrough in natural language processing (NLP), leading to remarkable advancements in text understanding and generation. Nevertheless, alongside these strides, LLMs exhibit a critical tendency to produce hallucinations, resulting in content that is inconsistent with real-world facts or user inputs. This phenomenon poses substantial challenges to their practical deployment and raises concerns over the reliability of LLMs in real-world scenarios, which attracts increasing attention to detect and mitigate these hallucinations. In this survey, we aim to provide a thorough and in-depth overview of recent advances in the field of LLM hallucinations. We begin with an innovative taxonomy of LLM hallucinations, then delve into the factors contributing to hallucinations. Subsequently, we present a comprehensive overview of hallucination detection methods and benchmarks. Additionally, representative approaches designed to mitigate hallucinations are introduced accordingly. Finally, we analyze the challenges that highlight the current limitations and formulate open questions, aiming to delineate pathways for future research on hallucinations in LLMs.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have emerged as a central focus in both industry and academia, but often suffer from biases introduced by visual and language priors, which can lead to multimodal hallucination. These biases arise from the visual encoder and the Large Language Model (LLM) backbone, affecting the attention mechanism responsible for aligning multimodal inputs. Existing decoding-based mitigation methods focus on statistical correlations and overlook the causal relationships between attention mechanisms and model output, limiting their effectiveness in addressing these biases. To tackle this issue, we propose a causal inference framework termed CausalMM that applies structural causal modeling to MLLMs, treating modality priors as a confounder between attention mechanisms and output. Specifically, by employing backdoor adjustment and counterfactual reasoning at both the visual and language attention levels, our method mitigates the negative effects of modality priors and enhances the alignment of MLLM's inputs and outputs, with a maximum score improvement of 65.3% on 6 VLind-Bench indicators and 164 points on MME Benchmark compared to conventional methods. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our approach while being a plug-and-play solution. Our code is available at: https://github.com/The-Martyr/CausalMM

Unimodal vision models are known to rely on spurious correlations, but it remains unclear to what extent Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar biases despite language supervision. In this paper, we investigate spurious bias in MLLMs and introduce SpurLens, a pipeline that leverages GPT-4 and open-set object detectors to automatically identify spurious visual cues without human supervision. Our findings reveal that spurious correlations cause two major failure modes in MLLMs: (1) over-reliance on spurious cues for object recognition, where removing these cues reduces accuracy, and (2) object hallucination, where spurious cues amplify the hallucination by over 10x. We validate our findings in various MLLMs and datasets. Beyond diagnosing these failures, we explore potential mitigation strategies, such as prompt ensembling and reasoning-based prompting, and conduct ablation studies to examine the root causes of spurious bias in MLLMs. By exposing the persistence of spurious correlations, our study calls for more rigorous evaluation methods and mitigation strategies to enhance the reliability of MLLMs.

Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) error correction aims to correct recognition errors while preserving accurate text. Although traditional approaches demonstrate moderate effectiveness, LLMs offer a paradigm that eliminates the need for training and labeled data. However, directly using LLMs will encounter hallucinations problem, which may lead to the modification of the correct text. To address this problem, we propose the Reliable LLM Correction Framework (RLLM-CF), which consists of three stages: (1) error pre-detection, (2) chain-of-thought sub-tasks iterative correction, and (3) reasoning process verification. The advantage of our method is that it does not require additional information or fine-tuning of the model, and ensures the correctness of the LLM correction under multi-pass programming. Experiments on AISHELL-1, AISHELL-2, and Librispeech show that the GPT-4o model enhanced by our framework achieves 21%, 11%, 9%, and 11.4% relative reductions in CER/WER.

Previous studies have found that PLM-based retrieval models exhibit a preference for LLM-generated content, assigning higher relevance scores to these documents even when their semantic quality is comparable to human-written ones. This phenomenon, known as source bias, threatens the sustainable development of the information access ecosystem. However, the underlying causes of source bias remain unexplored. In this paper, we explain the process of information retrieval with a causal graph and discover that PLM-based retrievers learn perplexity features for relevance estimation, causing source bias by ranking the documents with low perplexity higher. Theoretical analysis further reveals that the phenomenon stems from the positive correlation between the gradients of the loss functions in language modeling task and retrieval task. Based on the analysis, a causal-inspired inference-time debiasing method is proposed, called Causal Diagnosis and Correction (CDC). CDC first diagnoses the bias effect of the perplexity and then separates the bias effect from the overall estimated relevance score. Experimental results across three domains demonstrate the superior debiasing effectiveness of CDC, emphasizing the validity of our proposed explanatory framework. Source codes are available at https://github.com/WhyDwelledOnAi/Perplexity-Trap.

This study explores whether large language models can exhibit behavioral patterns similar to human gambling addictions. As LLMs are increasingly utilized in financial decision-making domains such as asset management and commodity trading, understanding their potential for pathological decision-making has gained practical significance. We systematically analyze LLM decision-making at cognitive-behavioral and neural levels based on human gambling addiction research. In slot machine experiments, we identified cognitive features of human gambling addiction, such as illusion of control, gambler's fallacy, and loss chasing. When given the freedom to determine their own target amounts and betting sizes, bankruptcy rates rose substantially alongside increased irrational behavior, demonstrating that greater autonomy amplifies risk-taking tendencies. Through neural circuit analysis using a Sparse Autoencoder, we confirmed that model behavior is controlled by abstract decision-making features related to risky and safe behaviors, not merely by prompts. These findings suggest LLMs can internalize human-like cognitive biases and decision-making mechanisms beyond simply mimicking training data patterns, emphasizing the importance of AI safety design in financial applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have succeeded remarkably in various natural language processing (NLP) tasks, yet their reasoning capabilities remain a fundamental challenge. While LLMs exhibit impressive fluency and factual recall, their ability to perform complex reasoning-spanning logical deduction, mathematical problem-solving, commonsense inference, and multi-step reasoning-often falls short of human expectations. This survey provides a comprehensive review of emerging techniques enhancing reasoning in LLMs. We categorize existing methods into key approaches, including prompting strategies (e.g., Chain-of-Thought reasoning, Self-Consistency, and Tree-of-Thought reasoning), architectural innovations (e.g., retrieval-augmented models, modular reasoning networks, and neuro-symbolic integration), and learning paradigms (e.g., fine-tuning with reasoning-specific datasets, reinforcement learning, and self-supervised reasoning objectives). Additionally, we explore evaluation frameworks used to assess reasoning in LLMs and highlight open challenges, such as hallucinations, robustness, and reasoning generalization across diverse tasks. By synthesizing recent advancements, this survey aims to provide insights into promising directions for future research and practical applications of reasoning-augmented LLMs.

The training of modern large language models (LLMs) takes place in a regime where most training examples are seen only a few times by the model during the course of training. What does a model remember about such examples seen only a few times during training and how long does that memory persist in the face of continuous training with new examples? Here, we investigate these questions through simple recognition, recall, and retention experiments with LLMs. In recognition experiments, we ask if the model can distinguish the seen example from a novel example; in recall experiments, we ask if the model can correctly recall the seen example when cued by a part of it; and in retention experiments, we periodically probe the model's memory for the original examples as the model is trained continuously with new examples. We find that a single exposure is generally sufficient for a model to achieve near perfect accuracy even in very challenging recognition experiments. We estimate that the recognition performance of even small language models easily exceeds human recognition performance reported in similar experiments with humans (Shepard, 1967). Achieving near perfect recall takes more exposures, but most models can do it in just 3 exposures. The flip side of this remarkable capacity for fast learning is that precise memories are quickly overwritten: recall performance for the original examples drops steeply over the first 10 training updates with new examples, followed by a more gradual decline. Even after 100K updates, however, some of the original examples are still recalled near perfectly. A qualitatively similar retention pattern has been observed in human long-term memory retention studies before (Bahrick, 1984). Finally, recognition is much more robust to interference than recall and memory for natural language sentences is generally superior to memory for stimuli without structure.

In large language models (LLMs), certain neurons can store distinct pieces of knowledge learned during pretraining. While knowledge typically appears as a combination of relations and entities, it remains unclear whether some neurons focus on a relation itself -- independent of any entity. We hypothesize such neurons detect a relation in the input text and guide generation involving such a relation. To investigate this, we study the Llama-2 family on a chosen set of relations with a statistics-based method. Our experiments demonstrate the existence of relation-specific neurons. We measure the effect of selectively deactivating candidate neurons specific to relation r on the LLM's ability to handle (1) facts whose relation is r and (2) facts whose relation is a different relation r' neq r. With respect to their capacity for encoding relation information, we give evidence for the following three properties of relation-specific neurons. (i) Neuron cumulativity. The neurons for r present a cumulative effect so that deactivating a larger portion of them results in the degradation of more facts in r. (ii) Neuron versatility. Neurons can be shared across multiple closely related as well as less related relations. Some relation neurons transfer across languages. (iii) Neuron interference. Deactivating neurons specific to one relation can improve LLM generation performance for facts of other relations. We will make our code publicly available at https://github.com/cisnlp/relation-specific-neurons.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

In this paper, we investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) actively recall or retrieve their internal repositories of factual knowledge when faced with reasoning tasks. Through an analysis of LLMs' internal factual recall at each reasoning step via Knowledge Neurons, we reveal that LLMs fail to harness the critical factual associations under certain circumstances. Instead, they tend to opt for alternative, shortcut-like pathways to answer reasoning questions. By manually manipulating the recall process of parametric knowledge in LLMs, we demonstrate that enhancing this recall process directly improves reasoning performance whereas suppressing it leads to notable degradation. Furthermore, we assess the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a powerful technique for addressing complex reasoning tasks. Our findings indicate that CoT can intensify the recall of factual knowledge by encouraging LLMs to engage in orderly and reliable reasoning. Furthermore, we explored how contextual conflicts affect the retrieval of facts during the reasoning process to gain a comprehensive understanding of the factual recall behaviors of LLMs. Code and data will be available soon.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has improved the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs), but it remains unclear why it works and whether it is the unique mechanism for triggering reasoning in large language models. In this work, we study this question by directly analyzing and intervening on the internal representations of LLMs with Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), identifying a small set of latent features that are causally associated with LLM reasoning behavior. Across multiple model families and reasoning benchmarks, we find that steering a single reasoning-related latent feature can substantially improve accuracy without explicit CoT prompting. For large models, latent steering achieves performance comparable to standard CoT prompting while producing more efficient outputs. We further observe that this reasoning-oriented internal state is triggered early in generation and can override prompt-level instructions that discourage explicit reasoning. Overall, our results suggest that multi-step reasoning in LLMs is supported by latent internal activations that can be externally activated, while CoT prompting is one effective, but not unique, way of activating this mechanism rather than its necessary cause.

We propose LLM-PeerReview, an unsupervised LLM Ensemble method that selects the most ideal response from multiple LLM-generated candidates for each query, harnessing the collective wisdom of multiple models with diverse strengths. LLM-PeerReview is built on a novel, peer-review-inspired framework that offers a clear and interpretable mechanism, while remaining fully unsupervised for flexible adaptability and generalization. Specifically, it operates in three stages: For scoring, we use the emerging LLM-as-a-Judge technique to evaluate each response by reusing multiple LLMs at hand; For reasoning, we can apply a principled graphical model-based truth inference algorithm or a straightforward averaging strategy to aggregate multiple scores to produce a final score for each response; Finally, the highest-scoring response is selected as the best ensemble output. LLM-PeerReview is conceptually simple and empirically powerful. The two variants of the proposed approach obtain strong results across four datasets, including outperforming the recent advanced model Smoothie-Global by 6.9% and 7.3% points, respectively.